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Constitutional Law in the Age of
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T. Alexander Aleinikoff t
Balancing: The metaphoric term generally used in the law to de-
scribe an exceedingly important conceptual operation. In almost all
conflicts, especially those that make their way into a legal system,
there is something to be said in favor of two or more outcomes.
Whatever result is chosen, someone will be advantaged and someone
will be disadvantaged; some policy will be promoted at the expense
of some other. Hence it is often said that a "balancing operation"
must be undertaken, with the "correct" decision seen as the one
yielding the greatest net benefit.
That some such process must be a part of any practical legal sys-
tem is undeniable. But that should not blind us to the extreme dan-
ger of too facile a use of "balancing" in a system of justice.'
This essay is an attempt to explore and evaluate a form of constitu-
tional reasoning-balancing-that has become widespread, if not domi-
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nant, over the last four decades.' Disputes over the wisdom and utility of
constitutional balancing were fashionable in the 1950's and 1960's when
Justices Frankfurter and Black represented different sides of the argu-
ment on the Supreme Court. At that time, "balancing" was largely at-
tacked for the illiberal results it produced in free speech cases.3
Today, the debate has all but disappeared. 4 Criticism from the left soft-
ened when it was recognized that balancing could lead to liberal as well as
conservative results.5 Academia fashioned a truce based on the view that
little separated the opposing sides except terminology and attitude.' Most
important, familiarity bred consent. As the Supreme Court applied a bal-
ancing approach to area after area in constitutional law, the methodology
began to appear natural.
In this Article, I will chart the rise and spread of "balancing" as a
method of constitutional interpretation. I will argue that balancing is un-
controversial today because of its resonance with current conceptions of
law and notions of rational decisionmaking. This complacency, however,
blinds us to serious problems in the mechanics of balancing and prevents
2. The acceptance of balancing as the predominant method of constitutional interpretation is
demonstrated by its frequent appearance in published student notes and comments. See, e.g., Note,
The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1238
(1986); Note, INS Factory Raids as Nondetentive Seizures, 95 YALE L.J. 767 (1986); Comment, The
First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials after Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1984). But see Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327, 329 (1983) (arguing
against balancing approach in favor of "a rehabilitation of a strict definitional approach to the act of
state doctrine").
3. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717-18 (1970); M. SHAPIRO,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 3 (1966); Frantz, Is the
First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 746-49 (1963)
[hereinafter Frantz, Reply]; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1442-45 (1962) [hereinafter Frantz, Balance]; Meiklejohn, The Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 329 (1960); Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1961); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245;.
4. But see Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592 (1985). The dispute over balancing continues primarily in the First Amendment area. Com-
pare Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819,
848-51 (1980) [hereinafter Baker, Press Rights] and Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness:
Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937
(1983) [hereinafter Baker, Parade Permits] (criticizing balancing) with Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-
Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 955-58 (1978) and Shif-
frin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212, 1251-52 (1983) [hereinafter Shiffrin, General Theory] (advo-
cating balancing). For additional discussion of balancing, see Elson, Balancing Costs in Constitu-
tional Construction: The Burger Court's Expansive New Approach, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 160
(1979) (discussing balancing in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
5. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires hearing prior to termination
of AFDC payments).
6. See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965); Black, Mr. Justice Black,
the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb. 19, 1961, at 63, 65-66; Schauer, Catego-
ries and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 296-305 (1981).
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us from recognizing how balancing has transformed constitutional adjudi-
cation and constitutional law. My purpose is not to propose a comprehen-
sive alternative to balancing, though I suggest that alternatives exist;
rather, I hope to raise enough questions about the form and implications
of balancing to force a re-opening of the balancing debate.
I. THE DEFINITION AND FORMS OF BALANCING
A. Definition
The metaphor of balancing refers to theories of constitutional interpre-
tation that are based on the identification, valuation, and comparison of
competing interests. By a "balancing opinion," I mean a judicial opinion
that analyzes a constitutional question by identifying interests implicated
by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional
law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests.
As Part III will show, this definition captures most of the work that the
Supreme Court does under the name of balancing.
Some commentators see balancing as any method of resolving conflicts
among values." As I explain below, choices may be made among values in
ways that are not based on an assessment of the "weights" of the values at
stake. Similarly, balancing, as I define it, differs from methods of adjudi-
cation that look at a variety of factors in reaching a decision. These would
include some of the familiar multi-pronged tests8 and "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approaches.9 These standards ask questions about how one
ought to characterize particular events. Was the confession voluntary or
involuntary? Did the government action constitute a "taking"? In answer-
ing such questions, one starts with some conception of what constitutes
voluntariness and involuntariness and then asks whether the particular
situation shares more of the voluntary elements or the involuntary ele-
ments. Or one begins with a checklist of factors that have been used in the
past to determine whether a "taking" has occurred. The reasoning is thus
primarily analogical. Balancing represents a different kind of thinking.
The focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves. Each interest
seeks recognition on its own and forces a head-to-head comparison with
competing interests.
7. See, e.g., Shiffrin, General Theory, supra note 4, at 1249 ("[Balancing is nothing more than a
metaphor for the accommodation of values.").
8. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally Nagel, The Formulaic Con-
stitution, 84 MI:H. L. R-v. 165 (1985) (examining constitutional formulas).
9. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986) (takings
claim); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496, 501 (1985) (immunity from suit); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (probable cause under Fourth Amendment).
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B. Metaphorical Forms
The balancing metaphor takes two distinct forms. Sometimes the Court
talks about one interest outweighing another. Under this view, the Court
places the interests on a set of scales and rules the way the scales tip. For
example, in New York v. Ferber,0 the Court upheld a statute criminaliz-
ing the distribution of child pornography because "the evil . . . restricted
[by the statute] so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
any, at stake.""1 Constitutional standards requiring "compelling" or "im-
portant" state interests also exemplify this form of the balancing
metaphor. 2
The Court employs a different version of balancing when it speaks of
"striking a balance" between or among competing interests. The image is
one of balanced scales with constitutional doctrine calibrated according to
the relative weights of the interests. One interest does not override an-
other; each survives and is given its due. Thus, in Tennessee v. Garner,1 3
which considered the constitutionality of a state statute permitting the use
of deadly force against fleeing felons, the Court ruled neither that the state
interest in preventing the escape of criminals outweighed an individual's
interest in life nor that the individual's interest outweighed the state's.
The "balancing process"114 recognized both interests: The Court ruled that
an officer may not use deadly force unless such force is necessary to pre-
vent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm.1 What unites these two types of
balancing-and the reason they will be considered together-is their
shared conception of constitutional law as a battleground of competing
interests and their claimed ability to identify and place a value on those
interests.
C. Which Interests Are Balanced?
We usually think of balancing cases as pitting the interests of the indi-
vidual against the interests of the government. Sometimes the interests of
the government are taken to mean interests in the functioning of govern-
ment, for example, the protection of the lives of police officers" or the
avoidance of administrative costs. 17 At other times, the government's inter-
10. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
11. Id. at 763-64.
12. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
13. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 11.
16. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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est is identified with the interests of the public, such as the interest in
national security"8 or the apprehension of criminals.19
While the individual/government conflict describes a large number of
famous balancing cases, including many First Amendment opinions,20 a
surprising number of cases involve different sets of competing interests.
Balancing may occur where the government is not a party 1 or when the
interests of two governmental entities conflict. 2
The interests considered in balancing opinions may or may not, be
grounded in the Constitution. In all balancing cases concerning federal
action, the competing interest of the federal government is grounded, at
least in part, in the Constitution; the challenged statute or conduct must
fall within the powers delegated by the Constitution.23 In other cases, par-
ticularly those challenging state conduct, the Court weighs constitutional
rights against interests not derived from the Constitution. In Schneider v.
State,2' an early balancing case, the Court weighed the injury to the de-
fendants' First Amendment interests against the state's interest in clean
streets in concluding that a municipality could not prohibit the distribu-
tion of handbills.
Although we tend to associate balancing with rights cases, the Court
has balanced in other situations. Again, sometimes the interests on both
sides of the scales are constitutionally-based-for example, in separation
of powers25 and inter-sovereign immunity cases.2 At other times, a consti-
tutional power is balanced against a non-constitutional state interest, as in
dormant commerce clause cases.2
18. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
19. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
20. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
21. For example, in cases involving libel actions, the Court has balanced the First Amendment
rights of the press against private interests in reputation. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 562-63 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (federalism); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (separation of powers).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985); Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
24. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
25. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986);
United States v. Nixon, 408 U.S. 683 (1974).
26. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938). The Court also has balanced the inter-
ests of one state against another in full faith and credit clause cases. E.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Some cases fall in several categories. E.g., Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (First Amendment right of press weighed
against constitutional right of fair trial and "needs of government to obtain just convictions and to
preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the identity of informants").
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D. "Definitional" and "Ad hoc" Balancing
Commentators have occasionally distinguished balancing that estab-
lishes a substantive constitutional principle of general application (labeled
"definitional" balancing by Professor Nimmer) from balancing that itself
is the constitutional principle (so-called "ad hoc" balancing). 8 New York
v. Ferber29 is an example of definitional balancing. Ferber's holding, that
the distribution of child pornography is not protected by the First Amend-
ment, may be applied in subsequent cases without additional balancing.
Ad hoc balancing is illustrated by the Court's approach in procedural due
process cases. Under Mathews v. Eldridge," the process that the Consti-
tution requires is determined by balancing the governmental and private
interests at stake in the particular case.31
The Court's choice of balancing methodology may influence results;
certain interests may count more or less when considered on a global or
case-by-case basis.32 Furthermore, ad hoc balancing may undermine the
development of stable, knowable principles of law. But the critique of bal-
ancing developed below will generally apply with equal force to defini-
tional and ad hoc variants.
II. THE ORIGINS OF BALANCING
Balancing is not nearly as old as the Constitution. As an explicit
method of constitutional interpretation, it first appears in majority opin-
ions in the late 1930's and early 1940's." No Justice explained why such
28. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPE.ECH §§ 2.02-.03 (1984); Henkin, Infallibil-
ity Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 Cos.uM. L. REv. 1022, 1027-28 (1978); Nimmer, The
Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CAI.iF. L. REv. 935, 942 (1968).
29. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
30. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31. Id. at 348. Definitional balancing may mandate ad hoc balancing. See, e.g., Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (definitional rule that entitlement of indigent parents to
state-provided counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights should be determined by ad hoc
balancing).
32. Ad hoc balancing may work against First Amendment claims (when compared to governmen-
tal interests in national security), but in favor of procedural due process claims (where the threatened
harm to the individual is compared with financial costs to the government).
33. There are some hints of balancing earlier. See, e.g., Missouri ex tel. Hurwitz v. North, 271
U.S. 40, 42 (1926) (due process for revocation of medical license satisfied if doctor had "reasonable
notice, and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being
had to the nature of the proceedings and the character of the rights which may be affected by it");
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.");
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (All rights "are
limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular
right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached."); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (value of nets and cost of judicial proceeding
considered in determining that summary destruction of fishing nets not violation of due process).
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a methodology was a proper form of constitutional construction, nor did
any purport to be doing anything novel or controversial. Yet balancing
was a major break with the past, responding to the collapse of nineteenth
century conceptualism and formalism8' as well as to half a century of
intellectual and social change. Building on the work of Holmes, James,
Dewey, Pound, Cardozo, and the Legal Realists, and flying the flags of
pragmatism, instrumentalism and science, balancing represented one at-
tempt by the judiciary to demonstrate that it could reject mechanical juris-
prudence without rejecting the notion of law.
A. The Non-Balancing Past
The great constitutional opinions of the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional
argument or justification. Marshall did not hold for the Bank in McCul-
loch v. Maryland3 5 because the burden of the state's tax outweighed the
state's interest in taxation."8 Webster's argument in Gibbons v. Ogden37
was not persuasive because he demonstrated that the interest of the na-
tional government outweighed the interests of the states in regulating in-
terstate commerce. Nor were the purchasers of land in Fletcher v. Peck 8
entitled to keep their property because, on balance, the interest in security
of transactions outweighed the interest of the State of Georgia in repealing
corrupt legislation.
To be sure, early Justices such as Marshall, Story, and Taney recog-
nized great clashes of interests: federal versus state, public versus private,
executive versus legislative, free versus slave. But they resolved these dis-
putes in a categorical fashion.3 9 Supreme Court opinions generally recog-
nized differences in kind, not degree: 40 The power to tax was the power to
destroy; states could exercise police power but could not regulate com-
merce; legislatures could impair contractual remedies but not obligations.
Nineteenth century constitutional doctrine was not constructed in a vac-
34. I adopt Thomas Grey's definition of formalism: "[Liegal theories that stress the importance of
rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or quite
abstract principles." Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 9 (1983).
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
36. Indeed, Marshall expressly noted the inappropriateness of ad hoc judgments; by adopting a
per se rule, the Court was not "driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department,
what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the
power." Id. at 430.
37. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
39. See Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Ris. L. & Soc. 3, 8 (1980).
40. See, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 488-90 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (analyzing Marshall's dictum in McCulloch that power to tax is power to destroy); Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same).
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uum. The Court was acutely aware of the interests at stake and the im-
pact of its decisions. In the Charles River Bridge Case"' for example,
both the majority42 and dissenting"3 opinions openly addressed the impact
of the Court's reading of the contract clause on progress and technological
innovation. But neither opinion based its conclusion on the relative
"weights" of the private and public interests.
Given the grip that balancing has on modern constitutional analysis, it
takes an act of will not to read, or understand, earlier opinions in today's
style. But careful attention to the Court's language makes clear that its
method of justification, its way of talking about constitutional law, did not
use the vocabulary of balancing. 4
This may be seen in an opinion that is generally viewed as the progeni-
tor of the modern balancing approach in the dormant commerce clause
area, Cooley v. Board of Wardens.45 In Cooley, the Court considered
whether Pennsylvania could require ships entering the Philadelphia har-
bor to have local pilots on board. The pilot rules clearly applied to inter-
state commerce, and the plaintiffs sought to have the rules invalidated as a
violation of Congress' exclusive power to regulate commerce among the
states. The Court disagreed: "Whatever subjects of [the commerce power]
are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan
of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress.""' In other areas, however, where local
regulation alone "can meet the local necessities of navigation," state regu-
lation of interstate commerce would be permitted. 47 Under this test, the
Pennsylvania law was upheld.
Cooley is certainly an instrumental opinion. The Court recognized that
interstate commerce "embraces a vast field," and that to permit only Con-
gress to regulate it would hardly be useful to a nation as large as the
41. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
42. Id. at 552-53.
43. Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting); see also The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
78 (1872) (noting that broad reading of Fourteenth Amendment would radically alter power relation-
ships between federal and state governments); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 623-24
(1842) (suggesting exclusive power of Congress to enact fugitive slave laws as way to avoid interstate
conflicts).
44. Thus, I disagree with Kenneth Karst's description of Willson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), as a balancing case. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. RF~v. 75, 78 n.14. While, no doubt, today we see the case as a balancing
case, any fair reading of Marshall's opinion makes clear that he justified his conclusion in categorical
terms: Draining a marsh by construction of a dam was an exercise of the "police power," not a
regulation of commerce. 27 U.S. at 252. I believe Laurence Tribe makes a similar mistake in his
description of the mid-nineteenth century contract clause codes. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTI'ru-
TIONAi. LAW § 9-6, at 467 (1978) (asserting that Supreme Court used "reasonableness" standard to
decide such cases).
45. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
46. Id. at 319.
47. Id.
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United States.48 In the case at hand, the Court was convinced of "the
superior fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of differ-
ent systems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and experience,
and conformed to local wants."149 But Cooley was not a balancing opinion.
The Court did not purport to weigh the state's interest against the burden
on interstate commerce. The solution was categorical. The regulation at
issue was not "of a nature such as" to demand a uniform rule established
by Congress."0
The bate-noire of modern constitutional law, Lochner v. New York,51
exhibits a similar mode of reasoning. In addressing the constitutionality of
the New York maximum hour statute, Justice Peckham did not balance
the interests of the state against the interests of the individual; nor did he
attempt to assess the importance (or "weight") of the various interests.
Rather, the "reasonableness" of the regulation was viewed as a question
of category: "Is [the statute] within the police power of the State?"52
To be "within" the police power, a statute had to pursue a legitimate
end, such as protection of health or safety; and the gains to health or
safety had to be more than fanciful-otherwise, the category of individual
liberty would evaporate. Thus, the Court required the state to demon-
strate that its statutory regulation actually contributed to healthier bread
or bakers. This attention to the strength of the state's interests was part of
the process of categorization, not a balance of competing interests, as the
Court's final paragraph makes clear:
It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the
laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the
police power for the purpose of protecting the public health or wel-
fare, are, in reality, passed from other motives. We are justified in
saying so when, from the character of the law and the subject upon
which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare
bears but the most remote relation to the law. The purpose of a
statute must be determined from the natural and legal effect of the
language employed . . . . It seems to us that the real object and
purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the
master and his employes (all being men, suijuris), in a private busi-
ness, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and sub-
stantial degree, to the health of the employs .5 3
48. Id.
49. Id. at 320.
50. Id.; see also Henkin, supra note 28, at 1038 (Cooley doctrine did not imply any doctrine of
balancing). But see C. BLAK, PERSPECrTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (1970) (Cooley rested on
Court's assessment of relative weight of state and federal interests).
51. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id. at 64; see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
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The Court's rhetoric does not conclusively demonstrate that it did not
balance competing interests in defining categories. And some might say
that Lochner and many constitutional decisions of the nineteenth century
were based on implicit, undisclosed balances. While this claim cannot be
disproved, I think it is quite unlikely to be correct. Indeed, the best evi-
dence that we have-the words used by the Justices-certainly runs the
other way. If judges thought that the weight of interests was the control-
ling question, would they not have wanted evidence and advice from the
parties on what interests were implicated by the case and what weight
those interests ought to be accorded? And would they not have sought
such information by making clear in their opinions what was motivating
their decisions? Furthermore, it seems odd to assume that a decisionmaker
would have wholly separate intellectual modes of analysis and expression;
and it would grossly understate the power of legal training to suppose that
the way a court describes its reasoning in no way reflects how it conceived
of the problem presented.5
As described below, balancing appeared as an explicit method of consti-
tutional interpretation in the mid-twentieth century. Two interpretations
of this change in opinion writing are plausible. First, something happened
to allow judges to express what they had been doing all along. Second,
ways of thinking about constitutional law and constitutional reasoning
changed and that change was reflected in the new form of opinion writ-
ing. The next section will explore the ample evidence for the second view.
B. The Call for New Forms of Constitutional Adjudication
There are a number of reasons why the Supreme Court might have
been searching for new ways of reading an old document in the third and
fourth decades of the present century. Three distinct complaints about
earlier constitutional methodology all supported a move towards
balancing.
920, 941 (1973) (analyzing Lochner as a non-balancing opinion). One can also see "categoricalness"
in commerce clause cases that spanned the Lochner era. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 271-72 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
54. This is not to say that the nineteenth century mind was unable to examine a constitutional
question from the perspective of the relative weights of the competing interests. Indeed, Thomas Coo-
ley appears to have supported balancing in dormant commerce clause cases:
The States may authorize the construction of bridges over navigable waters, for railroads as
well as for every other species of highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere
with the right of navigation. . . . The character of the structure, the facility afforded for ves-
sels to pass it, the relative amount of traffic likely to be done upon the stream and over the
bridge, and whether the traffic by rail would be likely to be more incommoded by the want of
the bridge than the traffic by water with it, are all circumstances to be taken into account
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CON.sIrruTIONAi. LIMrrATIONS 592-93 (1st ed. 1868) (footnotes
omitted).
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1. The Political Call
By the mid-1930s, the Court was viewed as wildly out of touch with
the needs and desires of modern America. After all, it had dismantled
much of the New Deal. For the most part, the New Dealers thought that
it was not the Constitution, but rather the interpreters and their methods
of interpretation that needed changing. The Constitution, read properly,
could yield results necessary and proper for a successful restructuring of
the American economy and federal/state relations. As Franklin Roosevelt
told the nation in 1937 in defending his court-packing plan:
[W]e have . . . reached the point as a Nation where we must take
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from
itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme
Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which
will do justice under the Constitution-not over it.55
A Court under fire may first respond by denying responsibility, by
placing blame elsewhere-such as on the Constitution or the nature of the
judicial role. 56 When it becomes clear, however, that what is demanded is
not an explanation for the bad news but rather a change in outcomes, the
Court may start searching for new methods of interpretation. The famous
1937 shift was such a movement. 57 Under the guise of returning to the
Constitution,5" the Court sought new ways of reading it.
2. The Judicial Call
It was not only Lochner that troubled the New Deal Court. The days
of substantive due process could plausibly be described as a frolic, a short-
lived, wrong-headed experiment. Reversing Lochner could have meant a
return to the original Marshallian understanding. But the problem was
that many of John Marshall's tunes simply wouldn't play any more. Cat-
egories designed to create and protect an ideal structure of federalism and
individual rights in the nineteenth century seemed out of place in a coun-
try that had grown in ways wholly unforeseeable by the Framers and
early Justices. The poor fit between doctrine and the real world led some
55. Quoted in G. GUNTHER, CONrTrrrIONAI. LAW 130 (11 th ed. 1985) (bracket in original).
For contemporaneous objections that the Court was imposing its political views in the guise of consti-
tutional interpretation, see C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DO(.-IRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed.
1932).
56. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
57. See R. MCCLoSEEy, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 177-79 (1960).
58. See Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 492-93 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
have said about it.").
The Yale Law Journal
members of the Court to question earlier constitutional truths, and they
did so with an eye more to social facts than to abstract categories.
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone led the early charge in constitutional law.
To Holmes, the absolutes of the past had to yield to experience and the
social facts of the day. Dissenting in a case in 1928 that woodenly applied
the prevailing intergovernmental immunity doctrine, he wrote: "In [Mar-
shall's] days it was not recognized as it is today that most of the distinc-
tions of the law are distinctions of degree. . . . The power to tax is not
the power to destroy while this Court sits."59 Brandeis carried his brief-
writing style with him to the Supreme Court. In dissent after dissent, he
criticized the Court for ignoring the facts of the social problem that the
challenged legislation was crafted to remedy. "Knowledge is essential to
understanding," he wrote epigrammatically in 1924, "and understanding
should precede judging."' Stone inveighed against "mechanical" interpre-
tation that was "too remote from actualities . . . to be of value."6
The call for realism in constitutional adjudication was not only a result
of the Justices' recognition that new times demanded new doctrine. After
all, doctrine had grown and changed throughout the nineteenth century in
response to the "felt necessities of the time."'6 2 The significance of the
Stone and Brandeis dissents lies in their attention to facts and social con-
ditions-the self-conscious analysis of the societal sources of law."3 The
new form of opinion writing was more than a change in literary style; it
reflected a new way of looking at constitutional law influenced by almost
half a century of ferment in legal philosophy. By the mid-1930's, the
academy's relentless mocking of the premises and performance of nine-
teenth century jurisprudence had taken its toll.
59. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex re. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
60. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 356-57 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (calling for consideration
of contemporary social, industrial, and political consideration by judges); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S.
590, 600 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is
arbitrary or unreasonable . . . should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or
possible.").
61. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting); see also Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926) (urging "practical construction").
62. O.W. HOI.M., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1963).
63. Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the charge of
being unreasonable or arbitrary, can ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of the
contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected
thereby. Resort to such facts is necessary, among other things, in order to appreciate the evils
sought to be remedied and the possible effects of the remedy proposed.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. at 356-57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U.S. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting) (advocating "consideration of all the facts and circumstances").
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3. The Academic Call
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the patron saint of all the various antiformalist
schools, had fired the first salvos long before. Holmes' views were based
on the now banal recognition that law is a product more of social experi-
ence than of deductive logic: "[Iln the broadest sense it is true that the law
is a logical development, like everything else. The danger of which I speak
is . . . the notion that a given system . . . can be worked out like mathe-
matics from some general axioms of conduct."' 64 In language that would
be quoted again and again, Holmes admonished lawyers to "think
things[,] not words . . .-.
Roscoe Pound broadened and deepened Holmes' attack. In a number of
widely influential pieces written after the turn of the century, Pound lam-
basted what he termed "mechanical jurisprudence"66 or the "jurispru-
dence of conceptions" in constitutional law. 67 The academic critique was
greatly aided by the non-judicial writings of Benjamin Cardozo, who took
"judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life."6 Again, Car-
dozo's willingness to admit a role for creativity and social responsiveness
in the law appears uncontroversial today. But, at the time, his analysis
raised a storm of protest.69
Pound and Cardozo, while recognizing the limits of logical deduction,
thought it still had an important role to play in legal decisionmaking.
Indeed, they believed that most cases could be disposed of without judicial
policymaking.70 The Legal Realists went a step further. The "rule-
skepticism" of some Realists denied that in any case "doubtful enough to
make litigation respectable," prevailing legal doctrine compelled an an-
swer.71 Legal opinions were no more than "trained lawyers' arguments
. . . intended to make the decision seem . . . legally inevitable; 7 2 they
64. O.W. HoI.MI s, The Path of the Law, in CoI.EC'rED LEGAL PAPERS 180 (1920) [hereinafter
O.W. HoMi.-s, The Path of the Law].
65. O.W. HOL.MEs, Law in Science-Science in Law, in COLLE."TED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
64, at 238 [hereinafter O.W. HoLMHs, Law in Science].
66. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YAI.E L.J. 454, 462-63 (1909); Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLuM. L. REV. 605, 610 (1908) [hereinafter Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence]. Pound
defined one of the manifestations of mechanical jurisprudence as "the rigorous logical deduction from
predetermined conceptions in disregard of and often in the teeth of the actual facts .... " Pound,
Liberty of Contract, supra, at 462.
67. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 66, at 610.
68. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDCIAL. PROCESS 10 (1921).
69. See G. GII.MORE, THE AGES OF AMERIC:AN LAW 77 (1977).
70. See B. CARDx)ZO, THE GROWrH OF THE LAW 59-60 (1924); Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 706-07 (1931).
71. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1239 (1931).
72. Id. at 1238-39.
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were based not on logic, but on judges' "hunches,"7  personal political
views,71 or psychological dispositions.75
The debunking of the role of logic in judicial decisionmaking was part
of a larger shift from the abstract to the real in legal philosophy. Nine-
teenth century conceptualism gave way to twentieth century instrumental-
ism. Law was viewed as a means to an end, as purposeful human activity
aimed at achieving social goals .7  The instrumental approach had both
descriptive and normative implications that revolutionized prevailing no-
tions of legal science. From the descriptive perspective, the scholarly critics
agreed that the study of law should concern "law in action," not "law in
the books."177 The normative side of instrumentalism, like so much else,
could be traced to Holmes: "[T]he real justification of a rule of law . . . is
that it helps to bring about a social end which we desire ....
Pound, 9 Cardozo, ° and Llewellyn"' expressed similar views, each in his
own distinctive language.
The philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey
heavily influenced the recognition of the limits of logic and the adoption of
an instrumental approach to law. 2 "The truth of an idea is not a stag-
nant property inherent in it," wrote James in 1914. "Truth happens to an
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events."83 This message of truth-in-
consequences supported a view of law as dynamic, functional, relativistic,
and experimental.84 Law was not a "brooding omnipresence," 85 but
rather a particular means to socially defined ends, and the test of the law
73. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision,
14 CORNEI.I. L.Q. 274 (1929).
74. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 113-14 (1970).
75. See id. at 119-20. For studies of the Realists, see W. RUMBI.E, AMERICAN LEGAi. REALSM
(1968); W. TWINING, KARI. Li.EWEi•I.YN AND TiHE REAI.IST MOVEMENr (1973).
76. See, e.g., Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 66, at 609 ("We do not base institu-
tions upon deductions from assumed principles of human nature; we require them to exhibit practical
utility, and we rest them upon a foundation of policy and established adaptation to human needs.").
77. See K. LI.EWELI.YN, THE BRAMB. BUSH 16-17 (1930); Cohen, The Problems of Functional
Jurisprudence, 1 MoD. L. REv. 5 (1937).
78. O.W. Hoi.Mxs, Law in Science, supra note 65, at 238. See generally R. SUMMERS, INSTRU-
MENrAIAtSM AND AMERICAN LE;Ai. THEORY 46-48, 61 (1982) (discussing views of Holmes, Pound,
Dewey, Cohen and other instrumentalists on theory of value and general nature of law).
79. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 66, at 605 ("Being scientific as a means
toward an end, [law] must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal
structure.").
80. See B. CARIX)ZO, supra note 68, at 66 ("The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The
rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence.").
81. See Llewellyn, supra note 71, at 1236 ("The conception of law [is] as a means to social ends
* so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect ....
82. See E. PURCEI.I., THE CRISIS OF DEMO(XRAric THEORY (1973); D. WIGDOR, RoscoE
POUND 185 (1974).
83. W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM 201 (1907).
84. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 78, at 30-33.
85. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Vol. 96: 943, 1987
Age of Balancing
was empirical. Pound made explicit the link between pragmatism and le-
gal scholarship in his influential article Mechanical Jurisprudence:
I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as scientific because
those who administer it believe it such. But in truth it is not science
at all. We no longer hold anything scientific merely because it exhib-
its a rigid scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions. In the
philosophy of to-day, theories are "instruments, not answers to enig-
mas, in which we can rest." . . . We have . . . the same task in
jurisprudence that has been achieved in philosophy, in the natural
sciences and in politics. We have . . . to attain a pragmatic, a socio-
logical legal science.86
Pragmatism reassured legal scholars that abandonment of the goal of
formal certainty did not necessarily entail nihilism; on the contrary, it lib-
erated scholars to develop and test new rules for new social conditions.
Thus Cardozo could write, without a sense of fear or intellectual paraly-
sis: "Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable.
There is an endless 'becoming.'" 8 7
Pragmatism also provided legal scholars with a new form of logic, one
that supported a different conception of legal reasoning. In an important
article published in 1924, John Dewey described a logic "relative to con-
sequences rather than to antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabilities
rather than one of deduction of certainties." Such a logic treated legal
rules in a revolutionary manner:
For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable consequences,
general principles can only be tools justified by the work they do.
They are means of intellectual survey, analysis, and insight into the
factors of the situation to be dealt with. Like other tools they must be
modified when they are applied to new conditions and new results
have to be achieved. 88
Pragmatism, therefore, supported the attack on formalism and provided
an instrumental, non-formalist mode of legal reasoning attuned to the way
in which law actually functioned in society. It also supported the research
agenda urged by Holmes, Pound, and the Realists. If the value of a legal
rule was established by its consequences, then scholars should eschew his-
torical or analytical treatments of legal doctrine for scientific analyses of
86. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 66, at 608-09 (quoting W. JAMES, PRAGMA-
TISM 53 (1907)).
87. B. CARDOZO, supra note 68, at 28.
88. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNE K. L.Q. 17, 26 (1924).
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"the ends sought to be attained [by law] and the reasons for desiring
them." 9
Where did the new legal philosophy leave judges? Certainly they were
far less constrained by legal doctrine than had been previously thought. In
some of the most celebrated phrases of our legal culture, Holmes and Car-
dozo acknowledged the creative freedom inherent in the judicial process.9"
And most scholars openly recognized that, in the new jurisprudential
world, not a great deal separated the judge and the legislator.9"
C. Balancing and Pragmatic Jurisprudence
To be put into action, a jurisprudence needs an interpretive methodol-
ogy. While a pragmatic, instrumental view of law does not compel a bal-
ancing approach, balancing was certainly a logical doctrinal application of
the new jurisprudence. Balancing openly embraced a view of the law as
purposeful, as a means to an end; and it demanded a particularized, con-
textual scrutiny of the social interests at stake in a constitutional contro-
versy. Thus balancing seemed to be just what the academic doctors would
have ordered.
Indeed it was. Holmes had written long before that "judges . . . have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of so-
cial advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often pro-
claimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to
leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often
unconscious . "...92 Cardozo had summarized his own analysis of the
judicial process as follows:
[L]ogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted stan-
dards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination
shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall dominate
in any case must depend largely upon the comparative importance or
89. O.W. Hoi.MF-s, The Path of the Law, supra note 64, at 195; see O.W. HOLMES, Law in
Science, supra note 65, at 242.
90. See B. CAnozo, supra note 68, at 166 (judicial process "in its highest reaches is not discov-
ery, but creation"); O.W. Ho.Mms, Law in Science, supra note 65, at 239 ("sovereign prerogative of
choice").
91. See B. CARtX)ZO, supra note 68, at 113; O.W. Hoi.Lms, Law in Science, supra note 65, at
242; O.W. Hoi.M.s, The Path of the Law, supra note 64, at 184; Llewellyn, supra note 71, at 1252:
If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the effect of a given premise; and if there is
available a competing but equally authoritative premise that leads to a different conclu-
sion-then there is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which can be justified
only as a question of policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked tongue.
92. O.W. Hos.MFiu, The Path of the Law, supra note 64, at 184; cf Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (applying balancing test to constitutional law).
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value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or
impaired.93
Balancing received its fullest explication from Roscoe Pound. In 1921,
Pound presented a paper entitled The Theory of Social Interests,94 which
set forth his view that the task of the legal order was the identification and
weighing of interests. Pound adopted Jhering's view of "law as a means to
an end"'9 5 and borrowed from James the claim that "the guiding idea for
ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this
poor world) [must] be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as
we can . . . ."" Together, these ideas supported the theory that:
[T]he law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to ad-
just . . . overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands, ei-
ther through securing them directly and immediately, or through se-
curing certain individual interests, or through delimitations or
compromises of individual interests, so as to give effect to the greatest
total of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civiliza-
tion, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a whole. 97
Pound clearly believed that his approach was appropriate to constitu-
tional analysis."8 The liberty of contract cases were wrongly decided, he
wrote, because in striking down protective legislation the Court had failed
to recognize the "social interest in the human life of the individual
worker."' 9
Harlan Fiske Stone, after some early skepticism about "sociological ju-
risprudence," ' became a devotee of balancing. In 1936, in his eleventh
year on the Court, Stone delivered a lecture at Harvard Law School, enti-
tled The Common Law in the United States, in which he assailed "dry
and sterile formalism."' 0' Stone asserted that the judge "is often engaged
93. B. CARDOZO, supra note 68, at 112; see also B. CARDOZO, supra note 70, at 85-127 (prais-
ing Pound and pragmatism).
For Cardozo, as for Holmes, the notion of judges as balancers was more a recognition of what
judges had always been doing than an exhortation to a new judicial mode of reasoning: "We are
balancing and compromising and adjusting every moment that we judge." B. CARDOZO, THE PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAl. StIENCE 75 (1928) [hereinafter B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES].
94. The paper was published two decades later. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1943).
95. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 15-16 (1959).
96. Id. at 16 (quoting W. JAME-S, The Will to Believe 196 (1897)).
97. Pound, supra note 94, at 39.
98. 3 R. POUND, supra note 95, ch. 14; see Pound, supra note 94, at 16-38.
99. Pound, supra note 94, at 9.
100. See Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 319
(1923); Stone, Book Review, 22 COI.UM. L. REV. 382 (1922) (reviewing B. CAROZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAl. PROCE-SS (1921)).
101. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936).
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not so much in extracting a rule of law from the precedents, as we were
once accustomed to believe, as in making an appraisal and comparison of
social values, the result of which may be of decisive weight in determining
what rule he is to apply. ' 10 2 Stone identified the "resulting tendency of
our legal thinking" as follows:
We are coming to realize more completely that law is not an end,
but a means to an end-the adequate control and protection of those
interests, social and economic, which are the special concern of gov-
ernment and hence of law; that that end is to be attained through the
reasonable accommodation of law to changing economic and social
needs, weighing them against the need of continuity of our legal sys-
tem and the earlier experience out of which its precedents have
grown; that within the limits lying between the command of statutes
on the one hand and the restraints of precedents and doctrines, by
common consent regarded as binding, on the other, the judge has
liberty of choice of the rule which he applies, and that his choice will
rightly depend upon the relative weights of the social and economic
advantages which will finally turn the scales of judgment in favor of
one rule rather than another. Within this area he performs essen-
tially the function of the legislator, and in a real sense makes law. 0 3
Stone made clear that this attitude towards the proper development of the
common law, when coupled with a presumption in favor of a statute's
constitutionality, was applicable to constitutional adjudication.'
Along with balancing's respectable intellectual pedigree,'0 5 several other
factors enhanced its attraction as a method of constitutional adjudication.
On the most practical level, balancing facilitated doctrinal change in times
of social flux. The law could grow because balancing focused on interests
in the real world; changes in society would provoke corresponding devel-
opments in constitutional doctrine. But balancing did not necessarily com-
mit the Court to a liberal or conservative agenda. Changes could occur in
either direction. As the First Amendment cases of the 1950's and 1960's
showed, balancing could provide for an expansion or a restriction of
102. Id.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Id. at 22-23.
105. Thomas Reed Powell was also an early advocate of balancing in constitutional cases, al-
though he never developed a general theory of balancing as constitutional interpretation. See Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States VIII, 32 HARV. L.
REv. 902, 930 (1919) ("[W]e must study the cases as practical adjustments of competing interests,
each of which is entitled to a degree of consideration."); Powell, Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional
Law, in 1 S.ErrEm) ESSAYS ON CONSITrUTIONAI. LAW 474, 478 (1938) (work of courts in constitu-
tional cases "is to a very large extent the task of weighing competing practical considerations and
forming a practical judgment").
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rights.10 6 Nor did balancing commit the Court to an overall theory of a
constitutional provision. The old conceptualization could be discarded and
a balancing approach could temporarily fill the theoretical void while the
Court groped towards a conception more attuned to the times. Of course,
there was the risk that balancing's flexibility would be viewed as unprin-
cipled adjudication.10 7 But the manner in which balancing proceeded un-
dercut this criticism. Balancing suggested a particularistic, case-by-case,
common law approach that accommodated gradual change and rejected
absolutes. The outcome of a case would turn on a careful analysis of the
particular interests at stake. Today, the plaintiff might win because of the
unjustified burden imposed by a governmental regulation; tomorrow, the
government could demonstrate an adequate public interest to sustain its
legislation. Balancing could keep everyone in the game. 08 It thus provided
flexibility without sacrificing legitimacy.
The attractiveness of balancing went beyond its practical utility. It was
the manifestation in legal studies of a far broader intellectual movement
that dominated the first half of the twentieth century. Darwinism, non-
Euclidean geometry, and relativity theory had shaken the foundations of
formalism in the traditional sciences; and the impact in the social sciences
was dramatic. Universals, logically deduced from fixed categories, gave
way to culturally-based, small "t" truths. The new science demanded em-
pirical observation of the ways in which societies actually functioned. 109
The balancing judge could assume the role of a social scientist, trading
deductive logic for inductive investigation of interests in a social context.
Moreover, substantive developments in the social sciences directly
linked up with the mechanics of balancing. In political science, pluralist
theory taught that law and policy were the outcome of competition among
interests.110 In economics, theoretical advances sparked the development of
cost-benefit analysis.111 The demands of a nation at war gave rise to pol-
icy sciences that applied the new theory to human needs. 112 Thus, judges
and academics, if even only vaguely attuned to the larger intellectual mi-
106. Compare NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating state law compelling dis-
closure of NAACP membership lists) with Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (bar admis-
sion for refusal to answer questions concerning Communist Party membership).
107. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 82 ("[I]t was widely felt [in the 1950's] that the Court
was using the wonderfully arbitrary capacities of the balancing technique to bestow First Amendment
rights on those organizations it liked and to withhold them from those it didn't.").
108. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARv. L. RFv. 4, 34 (1986).
109. E. PURCE.I., supra note 82, at 61 ("[Empirical investigation [became] the undisputed foun-
dation of all knowledge and the validating criterion of all theory.").
110. See A. BENTI.-Y, THE PROCUS.S OF GOVERNMENT (1908).
111. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 67-75 (1972).
112. Id. at 67-69.
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lieu of which law is a part, must have seen balancing as excitingly consis-
tent with developments in the social sciences in the 1930's and 1940's.
Finally, balancing was no doubt seductive-and continues to be seduc-
tive-because it fits our usual conceptions and metaphors of justice, fair-
ness, and reasonableness. Justice holds scales in her hands. We "weigh"
the evidence to determine which party prevails. In reaching difficult per-
sonal decisions, we list the "pros" and "cons." Policymakers undertake
cost-benefit analyses when choosing among alternative courses of action.
Balancing provides a careful, sensitive, thoughtful way to dispense justice,
to give each his or her due." 3 By gently urging us to consider all the
relevant factors, it fosters serenity and confidence. It is the mark of a rea-
sonable, rational, subtle mind. 4
For all its allure, balancing presented constitutional jurisprudence with
a difficult problem. As a methodology for bringing pragmatic instrumen-
talism to constitutional doctrine, it seemed to be precisely the activist, pol-
icy-oriented approach to constitutional law about which the public and
the academy had been complaining for a quarter of a century. Such an
approach might be acceptable in deciding common law cases; since the
legislature had the power to overturn common law doctrines, democracy
could triumph. But in constitutional cases, a court's scientific analysis
could not be supplanted by the popularly elected branches. The defense of
formalism ("we just find the law") was obviously no longer available:
Balancers lived in a post-Realist age, and they were painfully aware that
judging entailed choice, not deduction.11 5 How, then, could choices be
made without reintroducing the bane of constitutional law-the judge's
personal preference?
The answer lay in externalizing the balancing process.' 6 Judges ought
113. See Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CA.IF. L. Rt-v. 821, 825 (1962) ("Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his
decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them-more particular-
ized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes,
and selective history.").
114. See P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITurIONAL LIBERTY 96 (1956) ("The concreteness
and the tough-mindedness that characterize the judicial process at its best are demonstrated by a
careful examination of the facts before the Court in a given case and the resolution of the conflict by
reference to conceptions of underlying interest.").
115. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result) ("[I1n the end, judgment cannot be escaped . . ").
116. Another solution was to limit resort to balancing by deferring to the legislative process. See,
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Stone's famous fourth footnote in the Carolene Products case suggested an additional ap-
proach. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). While the Court would
generally defer to the legislative process, it recognized a "narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality" for legislation "which restricts those political processes which can ordi-
narily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or which demonstrates "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities. ... Id. Although footnote four today is generally under-
stood in "process" terms, see J. Ei.y, Di:MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980), Justice Stone
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to search for the relevant interests in society at large and give them the
weight that history, tradition, and current society attributed to them."'
The social science-like methodology of balancing instructed the judge to
look for values "out there." ' Balancing could be seen as primarily de-
scriptive. Just as a physicist could measure atomic weights without in-
quiring into values, so the balancer could discover that free speech out-
weighed governmental interests in public order without expressing a
personal view on the result.1 9 Constitutional law simply was the result of
the balance.
The balancers' belief in an external resolution of constitutional cases
was important because they were fighting on two fronts. Not only did
they need an alternative to Lochnerism; they also needed a response to
Legal Realism which, in its most extreme moments, spoke in nihilistic
tones. Although balancing was, in part, an outgrowth of the Realist cri-
tique of formalism, it was also a response to Realism. It attempted to
overcome the problems of indeterminacy and subjectivity that some Real-
ists had preached were inevitable. Balancing was a progressive, up-beat,
"can-do" judicial attitude. It was certainly likely to appeal to judges who
could not forget the lessons of Realism, but still had to decide constitu-
tional cases.
III. THE GROWTH AND SPREAD OF BALANCING
Balancing entered constitutional law like wild clover, not poison ivy. It
appeared in disparate fields, adding color to dreary doctrinalism. Once
rooted, however, it spread, ultimately changing the hue of the landscape.
Harlan Fiske Stone applied the new methodology with creativity and
seemed to be advocating a substantive approach: When the legislative process could not be trusted to
make law, the Court would have to evaluate the interests itself. Thus, Stone's "strict scrutiny" was a
call for judicial balancing-one that gave extra weight to the interests of ignored or underrepresented
groups.-See infra note 243.
117. [Sltriking the balance implies the exercise of judgment. . . . It must be an overriding
judgment founded on something much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference.
As far as it lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment. It must rest on
fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be
attributed.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see also B. CAR-
DOZO, PARADOXES, supra note 93, at 55 ("A judge is to give effect in general not to his own scale of
values, but to the scale of values revealed to him in his readings of the social mind."). See generally
Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE
L.J. 319, 327-34 (1957) (reviewing effort to eliminate purely personal preferences from due process
analysis).
118. Cf E. PURCE.., supra note 82, at 24 ("[B]y the end of the twenties particularist, functional-
ist objectivism was the dominant tone of the social sciences.").
119. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (due process analysis
"based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts, exactly
and fairly stated, [and] on the detached consideration of conflicting claims) (citing Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.)).
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vigor to commerce clause,120 intergovernmental immunity,12' and civil lib-
erties cases.122 Chief Justice Hughes in 1934 balanced the interests in up-
holding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law in Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell.2 ' In 1939, Justice Roberts wrote the first
explicit balancing opinion in a free speech case, Schneider v. State.2 4 In
1944, the Court, through Justice Black(!), ruled that government actions
that discriminated on the basis of race or national origin could be constitu-
tional if supported by "[p]ressing public necessity." '25
During these formative years, balancing was never considered the only
proper method of constitutional interpretation. Justices continued to rely
on existing doctrine and traditional methods of analysis in most constitu-
tional cases-even in areas where balancing had been adopted to resolve
other cases. The spread of balancing was hardly systematic. Balancing
simply seemed to appear when useful.
Over the past few decades, with little justification or scrutiny, balancing
has come of age. Every sitting Justice on the Supreme Court has relied on
balancing, 2 8 and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and
120. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
121. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
122. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting); see
also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (Stone, J.) (full faith
and credit clause).
123. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Although Hughes did not use the word "balancing," he stated:
"[T]here has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a
rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." Id. at 442.
124. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
125. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Dean Ely sees Korematsu as a case
about impermissible purpose. See J. EsY, supra note 116, at 246 n.45. And certainly the opinion can
be read that way. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[PIressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."). However, Ely's general description
of equal protection doctrine can only awkwardly explain the requirement of a "compelling" or "sub-
stantial" state interest. He argues that the "substantiality" prong of equal protection analysis serves
the function of identifying state goals so trivial that "you have to suspect it's a pretext that didn't
actually generate [the state regulation]." J. Ei.m, supra note 116, at 148. But Ely ignores the roots of
this branch of the test. The requirement of "compellingness" appears to have been borrowed from
First Amendment opinions of the 1950's and 1960's that required the state to bring forth very strong
reasons for burdening free speech and associational rights. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). It was adopted in early equal
protection cases. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). These were not opinions looking for motives; they were exer-
cises in balancing. Ely's work may be a reasonable account of what equal protection analysis ought to
be, but as history, it is, at best, "a brilliant reconstruction." Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 461 (1981).
126. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.); Ten-
nessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (White, J.); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Brennan, J.);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Powell, J.); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Blackmun, J.); Block v.
Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.).
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White frequently adopt a balancing approach. As a result, balancing now
dominates major areas of constitutional law.
In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has balanced in determining the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, 127 the definition of a search,1 28 the rea-
sonableness of a search, 129 the reasonableness of a seizure,130 the meaning
of probable cause, 31 the level of suspicion required to support stops and
detentions,13 2 the scope of the exclusionary rule,1 33 the necessity of ob-
taining a warrant,1"4 and the legality of pretrial detention of juveniles.135
Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for weakening earlier categorical
doctrines restricting governmental power to search and seize. 36 Occasion-
ally, however, the balance works against the government.13  Whichever
way the balance tips, the role of balancing in the law of search and
seizure is clear. As the Court has stated and restated, "'the balancing of
competing interests' [is] 'the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.' "'I'
Balancing has also become the central metaphor for procedural due
process analysis. The rise of balancing here is closely linked with the rec-
ognition of new forms of property protected by the due process clause. 39
The importance of "entitlements" such as welfare benefits and govern-
ment employment seemed to demand procedural protections against their
deprivation, but the ever-increasing size of the welfare state made imposi-
tion of procedures a costly enterprise.1 4° Balancing provided a flexible
127. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). See generally Note, The Civil and Criminal
Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127 (1984) (criticizing balancing methodol-
ogy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
128. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
129. See New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
130. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105
S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
131. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
132. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (upholding stops at
fixed checkpoints and referrals for secondary inspections upon weighing public and private interests);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
133. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
134. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (dictum).
135. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
136. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3320 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing balancing as process "in which the judicial thumb apparently will be planted
firmly on the law-enforcement side of the scales") (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
137. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (striking down state statute authorizing
use of deadly force against nondangerous fleeing suspect).
138. Id. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)).
139. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140. See Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YAI.x L.J. 455, 471 (1986).
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strategy that took account of both interests. By 1976, the Court had settled
on the now familiar three-pronged test of Mathews v. Eldridge.141
Justice Stone introduced balancing to the dormant commerce clause
cases. 42 Since the 1970s, the Court has increasingly relied on a balancing
test to decide whether state regulations impose an "undue burden" on
interstate commerce. The classic formulation is Justice Stewart's in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc.:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.14 3
Given the prominence of Pike in modern dormant commerce clause cases,
it is not surprising that a leading constitutional treatise concludes: "[tihe
Court now accepts its judicial role of balancing conflicting economic poli-
cies until such time as Congress chooses to act."'144
Balancing, of course, has had a long affair with the First Amend-
ment. 45 Balancing entered the field as a sword, striking down regulations
141. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). For recent uses of the "Mathews calculus," see Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3192 (1985) (upholding statutory limit of $10
fee for veteran seeking VA benefits); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
142. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Stone was aided by the scholarly
writings of Felix Frankfurter, Noel Dowling and others. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and
State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940); Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 720-25 (1925); Sholley, The Negative
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. C. L. REv. 556 (1936).
143. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted). Professor Donald Regan, in an important and
exhaustive review of the dormant commerce clause cases, has argued that a careful reading of the
"movement of goods" cases demonstrates that, despite what it is saying, the Court is not actually
balancing. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). Regan suggests that an anti-protectionism principle,
not balancing, best explains the results of the cases. There is much in Regan's tour deforce that is
persuasive; indeed, he may be correct as to what constitutional law ought to look like in this area. But
I have difficulty reading cases like Pike and believing that the burden on commerce played no role in
the Court's decision. Moreover, lower courts, lawyers and commentators continue to interpret the
Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause cases as directives for balancing. See, e.g., ANR Pipeline
Co. v. Schneidewind, 801 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1986); Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d
993, 1003-05 (2d Cir. 1985). (This is what makes Regan's thesis-that the Court really isn't balanc-
ing-so interesting.) Finally, Regan sees a role for balancing in what he labels "the transportation
cases." f.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
144. J. NOWAK, R. RO'rUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 270-71 (3d. ed. 1986); see
also C. DUCKxr & H. CHASE, CoNs'ir-rrONAL INTERPRETATION 548 (3d ed. 1983) (Court has
decided dormant commerce clause cases on basis of "a case-by-case balancing of the interests").
145. Pound had suggested balancing in free speech cases early on. Pound, Interests of Personality
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that were not intended to affect the flow of speech but that the Court
found to be overly burdensome. 4" Balancing was also an important tool
in early right of association opinions invalidating state statutes that re-
quired disclosure of the membership of civil rights groups.14 In the
1950's and early 1960', however, balancing became associated with the
Court's retreat from the protection of allegedly subversive groups. 48
Despite vituperative criticism of balancing as an unprincipled technique
for restricting speech, 49 the Court never abandoned the methodology. In-
deed, over the past decade the Court has resorted to balancing in First
Amendment cases with increasing frequency. It is well-established that
time, place, and manner regulations, as well as other "content-neutral"
limitations on speech, are constitutional if they are "designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alterna-
tive avenues of communication."' 50 Even within the once sacrosanct cate-
gory of content-based regulations,' 5' the Court is beginning to construct a
"sliding scale" of protection based on the perceived value of the speech in
question. As Justice Powell wrote for the Court in a recent libel case,
"[w]e have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amend-
ment importance.' 5 2 Speech pertaining to commercial 15 3 or private mat-
(pt. 2), 28 HARV. L. REv. 445, 454 (1915) ("[I]ndividual interest in free belief and opinion must
always be balanced with the social interest in the security of social institutions and the interest of the
state in its personality."). Zechariah Chafee relied on Pound's balancing to argue against restrictive
interpretations of the First Amendment. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV.
932, 958 n.85 (1919); see Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YA.E L.J. 514,
588 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 96 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
147. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
148. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 88-89 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51, 56 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959); American Communications Assn v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
407-08 (1950); M. SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 76-83.
149. See, e.g., Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. at 164-66 (Black, J., dissenting);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); T. EMERSON, supra note
3, at 167-68.
150. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986); see Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-95 (1984); Members of the City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984).
151. See L. TRIE, supra note 44, at 580-84.
152. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Justice Stevens
has been a persistent advocate of this view, suggesting that child pornography, New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 777 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); "dirty words," FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978); and adult movies, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), occupy a
lower rank on the constitutional hierarchy of protected speech. Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Dennis is perhaps the first expression of this view: "Not every type of speech occupies the
same position on the scale of values. There is no substantial public interest in permitting certain kinds
of utterances. . . ." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
153. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274-75 (1985); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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ters,1 5 4 or to child pornography 155 is now deemed to be of lower constitu-
tional value.
Perhaps the most surprising use of balancing in the First Amendment
area appears in cases involving speech traditionally accorded the greatest
degree of protection. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters,'56 in which the
Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting editorials by public broad-
casting stations, demonstrates that balancing has penetrated to the core. 15
Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, conceded that the speech bur-
dened by the statute "lies at the heart" of the First Amendment 58 and is
generally "entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment pro-
tection. 1159 However, he did not apply the normal high level of scrutiny.
Instead, the Court recognized the Government's interest in regulating
scarce airwaves and the public's interest in receiving a balanced presenta-
tion of views on diverse matters of public concern. Brennan formulated
the following test:
[Broadcast restrictions] have been upheld only when we were satis-
fied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced cov-
erage of public issues. . . .Making that judgment requires a critical
examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of
the particular circumstances of each case.160
The First Amendment story is paralleled by developments in Four-
teenth Amendment law. The two-tiered approach that arose from the
ashes of Lochner-economic legislation subjected to "rationality review";
statutes impinging on fundamental interests or relying on "suspect classi-
fications" subjected to "strict scrutiny"-is cracking, and a sliding-scale
balancing approach may be slowly emerging.1 61
154. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749; Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
155. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
156. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
157. For other similar examples of balancing, see Tashjian v. Republican Party, 107 S. Ct. 544,
548-54 (1987) (invalidating state law restricting voting in political party primaries to members of
party); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 142 (discussing need to balance speech on "matters of public
concern" with "interests of the state").
158. 468 U.S. at 381.
159. Id. at 375-76.
160. Id. at 380-81 (citation omitted). It is unclear exactly how strict the Court thought its test
was. In the end, we know only that an ad hoc balance was struck and that "the specific interests
sought to be advanced by [the statute's] ban on editorializing are either not sufficiently substantial or
are not served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the substantial abridgment of important
journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously protects." Id. at 402; see also id. at 415
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court should reach different balance based on "overriding importance" of
"keeping the Federal Government out of the propaganda arena").
161. Of course, even the old approach leaves room for balancing. Despite claims that the top tier
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Equal protection has witnessed the development of a middle tier of
scrutiny which requires that a statute be "substantially related" to "im-
portant governmental interests." This test has been applied to claims of
discrimination based on gender.62 and legitimacy,16 3 and, by four Justices,
to racial classifications intended to aid blacks.1 64 Mid-level review gives
the Court flexibility in adjudicating equal protection claims involving clas-
sifications which it deems troubling but not impermissible per se. Thus,
the government's interest in "administrative ease and convenience" may be
dismissed as not substantial enough to justify a gender classification. 65
However, the interest in remedying past discrimination against blacks
may be strong enough to sustain a governmental policy based on race.166
In substantive due process cases as well, the Court has fashioned a third
test, falling between "strict scrutiny" and "mere rationality." This mid-
level standard is the product of a regime of judicial review that seeks both
to protect non-textual "fundamental rights" and to avoid criticism that the
Court is operating beyond the bounds of the Constitution. Youngberg v.
Romeo1 67 provides an example. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell rec-
ognized that involuntarily committed mental patients have constitutionally
protected liberty interests in safe conditions, freedom from bodily restraint,
and sufficient training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.
But these interests had to be balanced against "'the demands of an organ-
ized society.' "168 Although the Court did not spell out the standard with
which it calibrated the scales, it clearly rejected the "compelling state in-
terest" test. Powell noted that such a test would place an "undue burden"
on the state. Powell's balance produced the rule that the Court ought to
defer to the judgment of hospital professionals, ensuring only that "profes-
sional judgment in fact was exercised. 1 169 The usefulness of the balancing
approach here is apparent. The Court may recognize a new right (and
of review was "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972), members of the Court have concluded on a number
of occasions that the state met its burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973)
(State may regulate abortions in second trimester).
162. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
163. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
164. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
165. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (opinion
of Brennan, J.) (" '[Aldministrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which
dictates constitutionality.").
166. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
167. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
168. Id. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
169. Id. at 321. Powell's opinion is thus reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
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hence permit further growth) without imposing stringent new burdens on
the state. Plenty of room is left for the state in the next case to present
reasonable arguments for placing restrictions on patients.
A general balancing approach may also be emerging in a class of cases
that lies at the intersection of equal protection and substantive due pro-
cess-the so-called "fundamental interest" prong of equal protection anal-
ysis. In Plyler v. Doe,170 the Court invalidated a Texas statute that au-
thorized local school districts to deny free public education to
undocumented alien children. Justice Brennan, writing the majority opin-
ion, recognized that illegal aliens were not a suspect class and that educa-
tion was not a fundamental right. Nevertheless, the statute was not judged
under the "minimum rationality" standard:
[M]ore is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether
[the statute] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether educa-
tion is a fundamental right. [The statute] imposes a lifetime hardship
on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling sta-
tus. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the
ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and fore-
close any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our Nation. In determining the ra-
tionality of [the statute], we may appropriately take into account its
costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims.
In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in
[the statute] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some
substantial goal of the State."'
Plyler and Romeo provide an interesting contrast. In both, the Court
struggles with the extension of constitutional doctrine to new areas of soci-
etal concern. Both cases raise claims to substantive rights, the satisfaction
of which could impose heavy financial costs on the states. In each case, the
Court jettisons the traditional two-tier scheme for a balancing approach
that considers the importance of the individual interest and the strength of
the state's justifications for its regulations. Unlike the two-tier approach,
the choice of a balancing methodology does not determine the result. In
Romeo the state wins; in Plyler the plaintiffs win. If these cases represent
170. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
171. Id. at 223-24. The Court's test is similar to the sliding-scale approach long advocated by
Justice Marshall. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3265-68 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
970
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a trend, then Fourteenth Amendment law is headed away from a multiple
levels-of-review strategy toward an overall balancing approach."7 2
Similar stories describe other areas of constitutional law. Over the last
fifty years, older ways of understanding constitutional clauses, amend-
ments, and structures have been supplemented, and sometimes replaced,
by balancing analyses. The movement is evidenced by the use of balancing
in cases interpreting the contract clause,173 the privileges and immunities
clause, 17 4 the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination 1 5
and double jeopardy, 7 6 the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of a jury
trial 7 7 and a public trial,' 7 8 the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment,' 79 the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause in criminal proceedings, °10 cases considering the rights and liabili-
ties of Richard Nixon'8 ' and other executive branch officers,"8 2 separation
of powers,8" and the right to domestic8 4 and international travel.'8 5
There are also indications that principles of federalism will soon be expli-
cated in terms of a balance of competing federal and state interests.'86
To see the current hold that balancing has on our approach to constitu-
tional cases, consider the following questions: Do mandatory drug tests for
pilots and train engineers violate the Fourth Amendment? May the gov-
ernment prohibit reporting on elections until after all the polls have
closed? Without a pause, our minds begin analysis of these questions by
thinking in terms of the competing interests. Before we have time to won-
der whether we ought to balance, we are already assessing the relative
172. See Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 167, 193.
173. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410-13
(1983); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
174. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).
175. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143-44 (1986); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 657 (1984); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225 (1971).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
177. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (remarkable, Jerome Frank-type
opinion written by Justice Blackmun disapproving five man juries); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 73-74 (1970).
178. See, e.g., Walter v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-47 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1984).
179. See Whitely v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084-86 (1986).
180. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-83 (1985).
181. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 450-55 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974).
182. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (198.2).
183. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986).
184. See Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1986).
185. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306-10 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1965).
186. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558-59 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing balancing analysis); id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating
balancing).
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weights of the interests. Constitutional law has entered the age of
balancing.
IV. AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF BALANCING
Despite the widespread use of balancing, the Supreme Court has spent
surprisingly little time exploring the difficult analytic and operational
problems the method presents. The following sections highlight a number
of these issues.18 7 The first set of problems takes the balancing metaphor
seriously and examines how interests are identified, valued and compared.
The second set of problems raises the question of whether balanc-
ing-even if adequately performed-is a justifiable or sensible method of
constitutional interpretation.'8
A. The Problem of Evaluation and Comparison
A frequent criticism of balancing is that the Court has no objective cri-
teria for valuing or comparing the interests at stake. As Laurent Frantz
has nicely put it, the judge's task is to "measur[e] the unmeasurable...
[and] compare the incomparable."18 9
The exact nature of the objection here is important. Some critics of
balancing surely overstate their case by claiming that balancing, because it
demands the comparison of "apples and oranges," is impossible. Whether
or not we can describe how we do so, we seem regularly to reduce value
choices to a single currency for comparison. In deciding whether to call or
to write, to move to New York or to stay in Los Angeles, to see the raise
or to fold, we often think of ourselves as weighing the costs and benefits of
the alternatives. We rarely hear objections that legislatures are unable to
value and compare competing social interests. Furthermore, we expect
courts to make exactly these kinds of judgments in crafting common law
doctrine. Professors praise the decisions of great common law judges who
conscientiously weigh the consequences of imposing liability or not, of
finding the contract binding or not. Even in constitutional law, we can
occasionally say with certainty that a particular interest outweighs an-
other. Will anyone doubt, for example, that the NAACP's interest in
187. I do not consider the usual practical critiques of balancing-that courts lack adequate infor-
mation to balance and that balancing produces a conservative bias. For discussion of these points, see
Baker, Press Rights, supra note 4, at 849; Baker, Parade Permits, supra note 4, at 942; Frantz,
Balance, supra note 3; Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv.
673, 717 (1963). Professor Shiffrin properly notes that balancing can achieve both conservative and
liberal results. Shiffrin, General Theory, supra note 4, at 1027-28; see also Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. RF.V. 353, 391-92 (1981) (describing balancing as tool of "perfection-
ists"-i.e., liberal constitutional theorists).
188. See infra Section V.
189. Frantz, Reply, supra note 3, at 748.
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keeping its membership list confidential in 1958 was greater than Ala-
bama's interest in having the list to aid in the enforcement of its foreign
corporation registration statute?19°
Competing interests are not, by definition, incomparable. Apples and
oranges can be placed on a fruit scale or assigned a price in dollars per
pound. The problem for constitutional balancing is the derivation of the
scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for
comparison. The balancer's scale cannot simply represent the personal
preferences of the balancer, lest constitutional law become the arbitrary
act of will today characterized as "lochnering."' 9' Moreover, a personal
scale would undermine a system of precedent and provide little guidance
to lower courts, legislators, administrators, and lawyers and clients.' 92
Balancing, therefore, must demand the development of a scale of values
external to the Justices' personal preferences. But from where and what
might such a scale be derived? This is a problem that has bedeviled bal-
ancers for some time.19 3 It is almost sad to read Roscoe Pound's attempt to
describe, in the multi-volume summary of his life's work, a method of
valuing and weighing interests. He states that interests must be weighed
on the same level (that is, individual interest against individual, social in-
terest against social) and that it is "expedient" to put interests in their
most generalized form to compare them. However, Pound concedes that a
scientific method of valuing the competing interests has yet to be
formulated:
Philosophical jurists have devoted much attention to deducing of
some method of getting at the intrinsic importance of various inter-
ests so that an absolute formula may be reached in accordance with
which it may be assured that the intrinsically weightier interests
shall prevail. If this were possible it would greatly simplify the task
of legislators, judges, administrative officials and jurists and would
conduce to greater stability, uniformity and certainty in the adminis-
tration of justice. . . .But however common and natural it is for
190. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
191. See Ely, supra note 53, at 944.
192. See T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 16 ("The ad hoc balancing test is so unstructured that it
can hardly be described as a rule of law at all."); cf. Reich, supra note 187, at 737-38 (balancing
opinions offer less generality than common law for application of precedents; they "tak[e] little from
the past and offer[] less for the future; each is a law unto itself").
193. And it was criticized early on. See Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law with a
Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L. RIv. 838, 844 (1922):
[S]o far as [balancing] means anything, it must be based on a knowledge of the weight of the
different claims. Apparently, up to the present time, few efforts have been made to solve these
problems. For instance, between two claims equal in every respect except that one represents a
force of the past, the other a new-rising force, which shall prevail? . . .If we have not even a
rough idea of what the weights are, it is logically impossible to say that any fact is the result of
the weighing.
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philosophers and jurists to seek such a method, we have come to
think today that the quest is futile. Probably the jurist can do no
more than recognize the problem and perceive that it is put to him as
a practical one of securing the whole scheme of social interests so far
as he may; of maintaining a balance or a harmony or adjustment
among them compatible with recognition of all of them. 194
Cardozo was no more helpful. He merely advised judges to "get [their]
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and
reflection; in brief, from life itself."1 5
In the search for an external scale-for weights "out there"-the mod-
ern Court has relied upon several sources that seem sensible. It may turn
to history196 or search for a current "social consensus"197 on the impor-
tance of an interest. Interests may also be assigned weight based on their
contribution to the achievement of constitutional or non-constitutional
goals. This instrumental valuation (often expressed in quasi-empirical
terms) is evident in dormant commerce clause opinions (measuring, for
example, the burden a state's regulation places on interstate commerce
and the safety benefits afforded by the regulation),"9 ' First Amendment
libel cases (evaluating the impact on the news media occasioned by various
sets of liability rules),199 procedural due process cases (examining the fi-
nancial burden that procedural requirements would impose on the govern-
ment),200 and exclusionary rule cases (considering the benefit of deterring
unlawful police conduct against the cost of excluding probative evi-
dence).20 1 Sometimes the Court looks at actual numbers, but frequently it
adopts a seat-of-the-pants approach, freely speculating on the real world
consequences of particular rules. 2
Whether or not these potentially conflicting sources of value are defen-
194. 3 R. POUND, supra note 95, at 330-31 (footnote omitted).
195. B. CARDOZO, supra note 68, at 113; see also B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES, supra note 93, at
55 ("A judge is to give effect in general not to his own scale of values, but to the scale of values
revealed to him in his readings of the social mind.").
196. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (right to marriage deeply rooted
in our society) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844-46 (1986) (right to homosexual
relations never recognized by society).
197. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) ("[S]ociety would insist that [privacy
interests] always yield to . . . the paramount interest in institutional security.").
198. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
199. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-48 (1974).
200. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
201. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-50 (1984); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 915-22 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976).
202. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (speculating on how class of illiterate
illegal aliens would affect unemployment, welfare, and crime).
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sible (and no balancer has developed a theory explaining which should
prevail and why), they do not solve the "external scale" problem unless
the same scale is applied to all the interests at stake in the case. It is here
that the "apples and oranges" critique has real bite. We may know with a
fair degree of certainty that society places a high value on procedural fair-
ness in the deprivation of property and that the cost of providing welfare
recipients pre-termination hearings is (let's say) $500 per case. But what
follows? Nothing in the "external" sources offers a clue about how to
compare differently derived values.
If constitutional cases rarely offer the possibility of a common scale,203
it should hardly surprise us that majority and dissenting opinions often
reach conflicting conclusions about the balance of the competing inter-
ests.204 More interesting are the techniques the Court has adopted to
strike the unstrikeable balance.
Sometimes the Court adopts a vocabulary to make it appear that it is
rendering values comparable. The best example of this strategy is the fre-
quent and increasing resort to cost/benefit terminology. But even the
quickest glance beneath the surface of the language of these cases shows
that the Court has not developed any common scale for evaluation. This is
evident, for example, in the exclusionary rule cases, which "weigh" the
"likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence" against the
costs of "loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that
flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that there-
fore occurs. '205
Another technique is to depreciate the value of one of the interests at
stake. In Branzburg v. Hayes,20 6 a case considering First Amendment
limits on grand jury subpoenas of reporters, the Court found that the re-
porter plaintiffs had not presented convincing empirical evidence that the
challenged subpoenas would significantly impede the flow of information.
This approach allowed the Court to devalue the First Amendment interest
203. A thoroughgoing commitment to an economic analysis of onstitutional law could avoid the
"apples" and "oranges" problem discussed in this section. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 581-642 (3d ed. 1986). "Economic efficiency" could serve as the common currency for evalu-
ating competing interests. But, even in its most empirical moments, the Supreme Court's theory of
interpretation does not adopt an efficiency standard. The Court may talk about "costs" and "benefits"
to give the impression that some agreed upon common scale is being used for weighing values, but the
Court's analysis is decidedly non-economic.
204. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Hobby v.
United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972). Thus, while the split between the majority and the dissenters was once about
whether balancing was a proper method of constitutional interpretation, today disagreement centers
on weights of the interests in the balance.
205. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
206. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
The Yale Law Journal
and uphold the subpoenas.20 7 What is not explained, however, is why
even a weakened First Amendment interest did not outweigh the grand
jury's interest.
A third strategy is to set up a constitutional problem in balancing
terms, but to decide the case without actually balancing. The Court some-
times avoids balancing by deferring to another decisionmaker's evaluation
of the interests at stake.108 In other cases, the Court sends up smoke, sup-
plying words that look like a balance, but in fact are something quite
different. Thus, in Roe v. Wade,"°9 the Court held that the state's interest
in protecting fetal life became compelling, and therefore outweighed the
woman's privacy interest in deciding whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy, at the point of fetal viability. "This is so," the Court ex-
plained, "because the fetus then presumably has the capability of mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb. '210 As has been noted, this state-
ment is a definition of viability, not an explanation of value.21'
The most troubling consequence of the problem of deriving a common
scale are those cases in which the Court simply does not disclose its source
for the weights assigned to the interests. These balancing opinions are
radically underwritten: interests are identified and a winner is proclaimed
or a rule is announced which strikes an "appropriate" balance, but there
is little discussion of the valuation standards. Some rough, intuitive scale
calibrated in degrees of "importance" appears to be at work. But to a
large extent, the balancing takes place inside a black box. Of course, the
hidden process raises the specter of the kind of judicial decisionmaking
that the Realists warned us about 212 and that balancing promised to
overcome.
207. Id. at 693-95; see also Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 (1982)
(state offers no "empirical support" for claim that automatic exclusion of press in cases involving sex
crimes committed against minors would encourage victims to come forward and provide accurate testi-
mony). The dormant commerce clause cases provide perhaps the best example of the Court depreciat-
ing an interest to resolve the balance. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 671-73 (1981) (plurality opinion); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779 (1945).
208. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
209. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
210. Id. at 163.
211. See Ely, supra note 53, at 924.
212. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Fourth
Amendment "'balancing tests' amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitar-
ian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will."); see also Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162-64 (failing to explain why state interest in protecting fetal life outweighs
woman's privacy interest at viability).
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B. The Problem of a Universe of Interests
Early theories of balancing were largely theories of common law adju-
dication. Under an instrumental view of the common law, the conscien-
tious decisionmaker would make an inventory of all relevant interests and
choose a rule of law that furthered social welfare in light of those inter-
ests. No interest-unless prohibited by the Constitution or a stat-
ute-would be ignored.
In theory, balancing strives to apply the same method to constitutional
adjudication.2"' The task is seen as requiring the consideration of all rele-
vant interests, whether traceable to the Constitution or to society at
large.2 14 Thus, due process interests are considered with governmental in-
terests in limiting cost and attaining accuracy. 15 First Amendment inter-
ests are weighed against reputation 218 or bureaucratic efficiency.217 Fourth
Amendment interests are weighed against the societal need to see how
public funds are spent.21 8 It is remarkable that in a scholarly literature
full of attacks on "non-interpretivism," it is never recognized that balanc-
ing-by transforming any interest implicated by a constitutional case into
a constitutional interest-is the ultimate non-interpretivism.
While, in theory, balancing takes an expansive view of what should
count as a constitutional interest, in practice, the Court never makes a full
inventory of the relevant interests. In Goldberg v. Kelly,219 for example,
the Court did not consider a huge range of interests that ought to bear on
the question of whether there should be a hearing before welfare benefits
are terminated. These might include broader societal notions of fairness;
the willingness of society to continue funding the welfare program and
other entitlement programs; the ripple effect of wrongful terminations on
poor communities, housing stock and crime rates; the morale of the wel-
fare bureaucracy and its views of its clients; the weakening or strengthen-
ing of political groups pressing for welfare reform. The Court no doubt
recognized that including these considerations would have turned the
opinion into a monograph on the welfare system. But on what basis (other
than convenience) does the Court restrict its balance to just a few of the
213. Cf Heineman, A Balance Wheel on the Court, 95 YALE L.J. 1325 (1985) (describing Jus-
tice Stewart's method as applying common law analysis to constitutional balancing).
214. Except those interests prohibited by the Constitution. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1985) ("'bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group'" not legitimate state interest) (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
215. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
216. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
217. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 564 (1973).
218. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971).
219. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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relevant interests? The point may be generalized. Taking balancing seri-
ously would seem to demand the kind of investigation of the world that
courts are unable or unwilling to undertake.
C. The Problem of Cumulation
Even if a balancer has properly identified the relevant interests and has
an objective scale for their valuation, there is still the problem of which
holders of the relevant interests should be counted. Again, consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,220 the case involving treatment of a mentally re-
tarded person involuntarily committed to a state hospital. There the Court
purported to weigh the individual's interest in safety and freedom from
restraint against the hospital's interest in confining his movements.
221
A solution to the particular dispute-whether Romeo had been denied
constitutional rights by Youngberg-should arguably have required the
Court to weigh the claimant's interest against the needs of the hospital.
But the Court does not only resolve individual disputes in constitutional
cases; it establishes general principles of governmental power and individ-
ual rights that legislatures will notice and lower courts will follow. Thus
the Court usually appears to adopt a global balance, examining the inter-
ests on some classwide basis.
In many balancing cases, however, courts make no serious effort to
place the interests of non-parties on the scale.222 In Romeo, the Court did
not survey other institutions in the state or around the country. It did not
estimate whether the conditions in the defendant hospital were typical or
whether the cost of fewer restrictions would be less burdensome in other
institutions. It did not "sum up" the individual weights of all Romeos or
ask whether other similarly situated persons might have greater or lesser
interests in freedom from restraint. Romeo stood for all patients and Pen-
nhurst State Hospital for all institutions.
This problem is endemic to the balancing methodology; the alternative
is an unwieldy litigation process in which the trial court would have to
make a complete survey of similar institutions. Every case would demand
Brandeis briefs of extraordinary complexity, and the costs of constitutional
litigation would skyrocket. It is no wonder that the Justices are content to
see Romeo as "all patients." However, in making balancing work, the
220. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
221. Id. at 320-21. The Court never defines the state interests, although it does give the example
of protecting patients from violence. Id. at 320.
222. Cf Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CM. L. REV. 28,
38-39 (1976) (criticizing Court for "incomplete and problematic" computation of private interests at
stake in Social Security disability claims).
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Court has adopted a truncated form that ought not to be acceptable to the
conscientious balancer.
D. The False Promise of Definitional Balancing
Professor Nimmer praised "definitional" balancing for its ability to
generate a rule "which can be employed in future cases without the occa-
sion for further weighing of interests. '223 It thus promises far more cer-
tainty than "ad hoc" balancing, which demands a new balance in every
case. Upon closer analysis, however, definitional balancing does not prove
to be a panacea. Any gain in certainty it provides comes at the price of
reduced coherence.
Assume that in Case 1 "definitional" balancing has generated a rule.
For example, the Court might conclude that the harms associated with
child pornography far outweigh its benefits, and thus that child pornogra-
phy is not protected by the First Amendment.2 24 Now in Case 2, a pro-
ducer of child pornography argues that he produces his works with less
harm to the child subjects and with greater First Amendment benefits.
What follows? Under definitional balancing, such arguments are ruled
out of bounds; these factors supposedly were considered in deriving the
first rule. But this response is untrue to the purpose and asserted strength
of a balancing methodology. If the pornographer in Case 2 is correct
about the harms and benefits of his work, why should he be burdened by
the earlier rule? The definitional balancer no doubt will respond that the
benefits of certainty outweigh the costs of wrongly punishing the
pornographer in Case 2. But it is difficult to imagine how one would
locate or evaluate data to substantiate this meta-balance. In Professor
Nimmer's work, this claim appeared simply as an assertion supported by
a fanciful hypothetical.2 25
It is therefore unsurprising that "definitional" balances are often un-
dermined by new interests or different weights for previously considered
interests. Such was the case in New York v. Quarles,226 in which the
Court carved out a "public safety exception" to Miranda. The Quarles
rule permits prosecutors to use statements of defendants whom police sub-
223. M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.03, at 2-17. I am reminded of the story about the crusty
Dean of Students who, in the late 1960's, argued for retaining parietal hours in a college dorm. When
it was suggested that students could do anything before 11 p.m. that they would seek to do afterwards,
the Dean replied: "Yes, but they can't do it twice."
224. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
225. See M. NIMMFR, supra note 28, § 2.03, at 2-18 to 2-20.
The Court appears quite willing to strike the meta-balance. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S.
Ct. 738, 743 (1987) (bright-line test for inventory searches essential for police in the field; no require-
ment that officers weigh strength of individual's privacy claim).
226. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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ject to custodial interrogation without first delivering Miranda warnings
if the officers' questions were reasonably prompted by a concern for pub-
lic safety. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by character-
izing Miranda as based on the judgment "that whatever the cost to society
in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply
have to be borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth
Amendment privilege. '227 Then he added a new weight to government's
side of the scales, public safety:
[W]hen the primary social cost of . . . added [procedural] protec-
tions is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority
was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred
Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the
whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more
than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting
Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply
to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to
the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public
area.
228
According to Justice Rehnquist, this additional cost tipped the scales to-
wards recognition of a public safety exception.
Rehnquist's opinion shows the fragility of a definitional balance and
the artificiality of the distinction between "definitional" and "ad hoc" bal-
ancing. 22 New situations present new interests and different weights for
old interests. If these are allowed to re-open the balancing process, then
every case becomes one of an "ad hoc" balance, establishing a rule for that
227. Id. at 656-57.
228. Id. at 657.
229. Rehnquist's move hardly guarantees coherence. First, Rehnquist does not explain why the
additional weight changes the Miranda balance. It may simply shift the balance toward admissibility
of the evidence without, in the end, tipping it. Second, Rehnquist concedes that the new exception, by
blurring the bright-line test of Miranda, entails "some degree" of additional costs. Id. at 658. Al-
though Rehnquist believes that these costs are not significant, we are not given any indication of how
a complete balance would come out. Not surprisingly, other Justices disagreed with the majority's
balance. Id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "public
safety" cost was included in original Miranda balance); id. at 678-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that majority miscalculated costs that implementing public safety exception would impose on
police).
Of course, the problem can run the other way too: the Court may strike a balance in Case 1, and
refuse to change it in Case 2 despite good reason to believe that the costs are different. In Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Court extended the rule of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
to allow impeachment use of statements that a suspect made after receiving Miranda warnings and
requesting a lawyer. The majority dismissed the dissenters' argument that the new rule provided less
incentive to follow Miranda, stating: "[Tihe balance was struck in Harris, and we are not disposed to
change it now." Id. at 723; see also Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 1569, 1644
(1979) (criticizing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1979), for failing to recognize
that balance in Roe might come out differently in case where the father opposes abortion).
980
Vol. 96: 943, 1987
Age of Balancing
case only.230 Balances are "definitional" only if the Court wants to stop
thinking about the question.
E. The Problem of the Individual/State Dichotomy
Balancing opinions typically pit individual against governmental inter-
ests. This characterization, however, is arbitrary. Interests may be con-
ceived of in both public and private terms." 1 The individual interest in
communicating one's ideas to others may also be stated as a societal inter-
est in a diverse marketplace of ideas. Time, place, and manner limitations
on expressive behavior may be based on a governmental interest in public
safety or a private interest in unencumbered access to public facilities.
Consider Hudson v. Palmer,28 2 in which the Court described a search
of a prisoner's cell as posing a conflict between the prisoner's Fourth
Amendment interest in privacy and the government's interest in jail secur-
ity. In that case, the prisoner's interest could also have been stated as a
public interest. Society has a general interest in preventing unwarranted
governmental intrusions. Extending the Fourth Amendment's protection
of privacy in one context may contribute to, and reinforce, a social sense of
personal freedom and liberty. As a collective body, we are in the cell with
Palmer; the interests at stake are not his alone. Similarly, the govern-
ment's interest in prison security may also be stated as a private interest.
Both prisoners and guards have an individualized interest in being free
from assaults and in having a governmental authority protect them. Be-
cause public and private interests appear on both sides, there is little sense
in seeing the balance in terms of individual versus governmental
interests.233
230. Compare Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987) (applying established Fourth Amend-
ment rule regulating inventory searches) with id. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing against
application of earlier rule because government interests weaker and individual interests stronger in
present case).
The "un-definitionalness" of "definitional" balancing is evidenced by the line of cases that followed
Professor Nimmer's prime example, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See M.
NIMMI.R, supra note 28, § 2.05[c][1]. In these cases, the Court has repeatedly "re-struck" the New
York Times balance in crafting a body of rules regarding libel laws and the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). In my view, it is simply a matter of taste whether one
views these cases as illustrations of "definitional" or "ad hoe" balancing.
231. Pound, supra note 94, at 1-2. Pound identified three levels of interests: individual, public
and social. The Court generally speaks of two, collapsing public and societal into governmental. I will
do the same and use governmental, public, and social interchangeably.
232. 468 U.S. 517 (1985).
233. Cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (criticizing Court's recognition of government interest in apprehending
criminals but not in protecting privacy).
The Court occasionally recognizes that individual and governmental interests coincide. See, e.g.,
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (government and parent share interest in accurate
parental rights termination proceedings); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (society
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To answer these problems, Roscoe Pound recommended that interests
be compared "on the same plane,"23 4 and occasionally the Court does
so.235 But this "solution" reintroduces the incompleteness objection dis-
cussed above. In Hudson v. Palmer, one could state the conflict as the
social interest in freedom from unreasonable searches versus the social in-
terest in prison security. But this eliminates from the balance the very real
private interests at stake.
The preceding critique takes balancing on its own terms and examines
how effectively the methodology identifies and "weighs" interests. What is
so surprising is how rudimentary the process appears. 236 No system of
identification, evaluation, and comparison of interests has been developed.
The inventory of interests has largely been reduced to the individual's
against the state's; weights are asserted, not argued for. A theory of inter-
pretation created to bring realism to law and to limit subjectivity in consti-
tutional interpretation seems more and more manipulative.
The problems that plague most balancing opinions, I believe, have se-
verely damaged the credibility of the methodology. Perhaps the saddest
example is the Court's decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices.237 The issue in the case was whether the due process clause entitled
Lassiter to counsel at the state's expense in a proceeding to terminate her
parental rights. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart constructed a
double balance to answer the constitutional question: "The case of Ma-
thews v. Eldridge propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding
what due process requires . . . . We must balance these elements against
each other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the pre-
sumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indi-
gent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom. '23 8
Stewart concluded that the Mathews v. Eldridge part of this test fa-
and defendant share interest in exceptions to double jeopardy rule).
234. Pound, supra note 94, at 2.
235. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) (balancing public interest in news
gathering against public interest in prosecuting crimes).
236. A German lawyer's critique of Interessenjurisprudenz-an early 20th Century German
school of legal philosophy that urged balancing of the interests in statutory interpretation-is applica-
ble here:
The fact that in the twenty years that have passed since [the] first publication on the subject,
the Jurisprudence of Interests, despite the considerable number of its disciples, has not even
advanced one step beyond a purely casuistic treatment. . . . [Tihe general idea that legal rules
should be established through the evaluation of interests is far from being a method; at best it
is a program.
Isay, The Method of the Jurisprudence of Interests: A Critical Study, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERESTS 321 (M. Schock ed. 1948) (footnote omitted).
237. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
238. Id. at 27.
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vored the parent's right to counsel: The parent's interest was strong, the
state had a relatively weak pecuniary interest in informal proceedings, and
the risk of erroneous deprivation was great.139 He then weighed this con-
clusion against the presumption that an indigent receives appointed coun-
sel only when her personal liberty is threatened. The result was a rule
requiring an ad hoc balance in each case:
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at
their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not
overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel,
and that due process did not therefore require the appointment of
counsel. But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so distrib-
uted, and since "due process is not so rigid as to require that the
significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must al-
ways be sacrificed," neither can we say that the Constitution re-
quires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination pro-
ceeding. We therefore . . . leave the decision whether due process
calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termina-
tion proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial
court, subject, of course, to appellate review.240
The opinion in Lassiter may simply demonstrate the difficulty of com-
manding a majority in a badly divided Court. (Who knows which Justice
of the five-person majority insisted on which balance). But I fear it proves
far more. The opinion reflects both the dominance of balancing in the
contemporary judicial mind and its emptiness as a methodology. All of
Stewart's balances seem largely irrelevant to the holding: that courts
should decide a parent's right to counsel on a case-by-case basis. And that
holding implicates a host of factors never considered by the Court, such as
who will make the initial decision, what bias the decisionmaker is likely to
have, and how well a court can-on a record prepared without coun-
sel-review the decision of whether counsel was needed.241 Although
Stewart's opinion uses all the right words, in the end they are simply that:
just words. No conviction, no belief in the justness of the result informs
the opinion. Balancing has become mechanical jurisprudence. It has lost
its ability to persuade.
239. Id. at 27-31.
240. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)) (citation omitted).
241. See id. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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V. THE EXTERNAL CRITIQUE OF BALANCING
Perhaps a Hercules of a judge (or a well-programmed computer) could
balance in a manner that overcomes the preceding "internal" critique. But
balancing also implicates deeper questions about the role of the Court and
the nature of judicial review. This section links these concerns with the
earlier discussion to argue that balancing builds upon, and fosters, an in-
appropriate conception of constitutional law.
A. The Role of the Court
A common objection to balancing as a method of constitutional adjudi-
cation is that it appears to replicate the job that a democratic society de-
mands of its legislature. The legislative aspect of balancing has become
quite pronounced in a number of recent opinions that have openly ex-
plored the "costs" and "benefits" of constitutional rules and appealed to
empirical evidence of the effect of constitutional doctrine on societal inter-
ests.242 Such a methodology may be an appropriate model for common law
adjudication. But balancing needs to be defended in constitutional inter-
pretation where the decision of a court supplants a legislative decision.
What defense might be offered for an understanding of the role of the
Court as replicating the legislative task? Some may view judicial balanc-
ing as a way to catch errors in the legislative calculations. Just as we do
sums twice to check our addition, so we might want to rebalance interests
through judicial review. But normally when our second sum is not the
same as the first, we add again. Thus this defense must develop a theory
that explains why we always accept the judiciary's calculation. Moreover,
the structure established by the Constitution explicitly provides for an
"addition-checker" in the form of bicameralism.
A better argument for the balancer is that the Court improves the bal-
ancing process by giving weight to interests that the legislature tends to
ignore or undervalue. Under this view, the Court plays two important
roles. First, it reinforces representation, ensuring that the interests of un-
popular or underrepresented groups are counted and counted fairly.243
242. See cases cited supra notes 198-202.
243. See J. Es.v, supra note 116, at 88-104 (discussing representation-reinforcing role of Court).
A "footnote four" defense of balancing may seem paradoxical, given the current dominance of Dean
Ely's view that the footnote is a source for process-based interpretive strategies. But the author of
footnote four was an advocate of balancing, see supra text accompanying notes 100-104, and seems to
have adopted a substantive reading of the footnote (that is, that the Court ought to give under-
represented groups a "plus" in the general balancing process). See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586, 605-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting); Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in MR. Jus-
TICE 63 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. 1956) (Stone "clearly indicated that where tough-minded
inquiry and weighing of competing values were required, he had no fear of the decision-making
process or of the consequences of his decision."); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1176-77 (1977).
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Second, it protects constitutional rights and interests that are sometimes
forgotten in the hurly-burly of politics.2 "
Both of these "thumb-on-the-scales" claims are plausible. Legislators
may have difficulty crediting the interests of minority groups to which
they do not belong.24 5 We might also be justifiably suspicious of the legis-
lature's evaluation of constitutional interests that conflict with popular
governmental conduct. Thus the balancer may claim that her form of con-
stitutional interpretation provides a procedural and a substantive2 46 justifi-
cation for judicial review.
While these arguments may point to troubling flaws in the legislative
process, they do not alone establish a justification for the judiciary's per-
formance of the legislative task. The argument from undervalued interests
might support a model of judicial review analogous to court review of
administrative decisions: If a court determines that an agency has ignored
or misevaluated relevant interests, it may order the agency to go through
the decisionmaking process again. Similarly, a conclusion that the legisla-
ture has wrongfully ignored certain interests might justify judicial review
in the form of a "suspensive veto"'247 and a "remand. 2-48 But it does not
warrant an evaluation and balancing of the interests by the court. Once
the legislature has openly considered the values that the court tells it are
at stake, what grounds are there for preferring a court's subsequent deter-
mination of the balance?
A balancer might respond that it is improper to portray judicial bal-
ancing as duplicating legislative balancing. According to this view, a bal-
ancing approach attempts not to maximize social welfare or represent vot-
ers. Its primary focus is the Constitution. It simply insists that the
Constitution not be interpreted in a vacuum and that courts be aware of
the social context and impact of constitutional doctrine. The court that
balances, the argument might run, is really searching for a reasonable
understanding of the Constitution-one that harmonizes constitutional
provisions and values with important governmental interests. The balan-
cing court does not replicate the legislative function or supplant legislative
244. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 & n.27 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); A.
BICKEI., THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28 (2d ed. 1986).
245. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 375 (1986); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976).
246. See West, In the Interest of the Governed: A Utilitarian Justification for Substantive Judi-
cial Review, 18 GA. L. REV. 469 (1984) (arguing that court may be able to make utilitarian calcula-
tion better than legislature or majority that values its interests too highly or undervalues other
interests).
247. See Sandalow, supra note 243, at 1183-93.
248. See G. CAI.ABRusI , A COMMON LAW FOR THE A(;F OF STATUTES 17 (1982); Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14-35 (1957).
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judgments of good social policy. It uses the legislative act as a measure of
social importance and thus as a basis for calculating the degree to which
the constitutional interest should be "softened." 249
I think that this is the balancer's best case, and it does indeed supply a
role for the court distinct from those of the other branches of government.
The judicial role might be described as: Protect and preserve all constitu-
tional interests, taking into account the value that the other branches place
on achieving other legitimate ends. But this description raises a deep, and
generally unaddressed, problem. Even if the balancing court purports to
accept the value that the legislature places on its own output, it cannot
simply factor the legislature's determination into a constitutional calculus.
It must first convert the constitutional value and the legislative value into
a common currency. How does a court decide how "important" a legisla-
tive or administrative policy is? For example, why are a "city's aesthetic
interests" sufficiently "substantial" to sustain a city ordinance prohibiting
political posters on utility poles,250 but "administrative convenience" not
an adequate justification for requiring servicewomen (but not servicemen)
to prove the dependency of their spouses to receive housing allowances?25
At work here is some undisclosed scale of social value, one not obviously
derived from the Constitution. Balancers must defend this inevitable as-
pect of balancing. They must suggest reasons why judgments assigning a
social value to legislation are within the province and capacity of the
courts.
B. The Conception of Constitutional Law
For the balancer, constitutional law is comprised of principles discov-
ered by weighing interests relevant to resolution of a particular constitu-
tional problem. These interests may be traceable to the Constitution itself
(free speech, federal regulation of commerce) or discoverable elsewhere
(clean streets, law enforcement). Some interests are accorded great weight
because society generally recognizes their importance, others because they
are located in the Constitution. Indeed, one may understand the Constitu-
tion, from the balancer's point of view, as a document intended to ensure
that judges (among others) treat particular interests with respect. It is an
honor roll of interests.
Although this conception of law may have brought realism to the com-
mon law, it threatens to do real damage to constitutional law. Early critics
of balancing were largely concerned about the impact of the methodology
249. See C. DU:A'r, MODS OF CoNs'rrrtrrIoNAL INrERPRE TATION 133-34 (1978) (contrasting
legislative and judicial balancing).
250. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
251. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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on the protection of constitutional rights.2 52 And, as Ronald Dworkin has
tirelessly argued, viewing constitutional rights simply as "interests" that
may be overcome by other non-constitutional interests does not accord
with common understandings of the meaning of a "right."25 3
But the implications of balancing for constitutional law go far beyond
strategic discussions about the best way to protect constitutional rights. (In
fact, since the original critiques, balancing has proven to be a robust
methodology for the creation and extension of rights). Balancing is under-
mining our usual understanding of constitutional law as an interpretive
enterprise. In so doing, it is transforming constitutional discourse into a
general discussion of the reasonableness of governmental conduct.
One can see this trend most clearly in opinions that define or describe a
constitutional right and then weigh the right against competing state in-
terests. Here, balancing appears as an extra step in constitutional inter-
pretation. Once a court has done the hard work of explicating a constitu-
tional provision through the usual methods of textual, precedential, and
consequentialist reasoning, the result is subjected to another test-the
weight of competing interests.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper" provides an example. In
Piper, the Court held that New Hampshire's residency requirement for
state bar admissions violated the privileges and immunities clause of Arti-
cle IV. The Court reasoned that the privileges and immunities clause
"was intended to 'fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sover-
eign States' ,255 and to "create a national economic union. ' 256 This un-
derstanding of the clause leaves some room for state discrimination against
nonresidents: denying access to trivial state opportunities (such as elk
hunting)257 does not threaten national unity; and requiring residency for
certain political activities (such as voting and office-holding) is justifiable
as a way to preserve the states as sovereign political communities. 258
Under this analysis, the Court concluded that the residency requirement
for bar membership could not stand. Lawyering is important enough to
252. See T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 717-18; Frantz, Reply, supra note 3; Frantz, Balance,
supra note 3. This argument has never gone of out style. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 556
n.33 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials .... ) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943))).
253. See R. DWORKIN, TAKIN; Rmrrs SERIousLY 194, 269 (1977); see also Thomson, The
Trolley Problem, 94 YAi.- L.J. 1395, 1404 (1985) (adopting Dworkin's view that "[rights 'trump'
utilities").
254. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
255. Id. at 279 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
256. Id. at 280.
257. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
258. 470 U.S. at 282-83 & n.16.
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come within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause and not
so closely related to the exercise of state sovereign power to justify dis-
crimination against non-residents.
So far so good. But then came the inevitable intrusion of balancing:
The conclusion that [the residency requirement] deprives nonresi-
dents of a protected privilege does not end our inquiry. The Court
has stated that '[1]ike many other constitutional provisions, the privi-
leges and immunities clause is not an absolute. The Clause does not
preclude discrimination against nonresidents where: (i) there is a
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the dis-
crimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial rela-
tionship to the State's objective. 59
The Court then considered the state's reasons for limiting bar admissions
to residents. These included ensuring that lawyers behave ethically, be
available for court dates and pro bono work, and keep up with local rules
and procedures. The Court ultimately concluded that none of these inter-
ests met the test of "substantiality" and that excluding nonresidents from
the bar did not bear the necessary relationship to these interests.2"' What
is not offered is any justification for the balance tacked on to the end of an
otherwise sensible constitutional opinion. Why does the Court feel com-
pelled to turn a constitutional judgment into a discussion of the reasona-
bleness of the state regulation?.. 1
Not all balancing opinions add the balance at the end. Many view the
underlying constitutional principle itself in balancing terms. Thus, in pro-
cedural due process cases, the constitutional requirement is determined by
comparing the weights of three interests.262 Here the problem is that bal-
ancing does not require the Court to develop and defend a theoretical un-
derstanding of a constitutional provision. Under a balancing approach, the
Court searches the landscape for interests implicated by the case, identifies
a few, and reaches a reasonable accommodation among them. In so doing,
the Court largely ignores the usual stuff of constitutional interpreta-
tion-the investigation and manipulation of texts (such as constitutional
language, prior cases, even-perhaps-our "ethical tradition" 26 3 ).
259. Id. at 284 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
260. Id. at 287.
261. Commentators, too, use balancing in this fashion. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHI.. & PUB. AFF. 107, 165-68 (1975) (after penetrating analysis of meaning of
equal protection, author asserts that his "group-disadvantaged principle" must be tempered to accom-
modate "considerations of total welfare").
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
263. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 558 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
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Balancing at its bleakest, to use Justice Brennan's phrase, is "doctrinally
destructive nihilism. 264
This revolt against theory is most troubling in cases that balance consti-
tutional and non-constitutional interests. In these cases, the Constitution is
viewed as a broom closet in which constitutional interests are stored and
taken out when appropriate to be considered with other social values. Be-
cause the weight of the constitutional interest is usually assumed to be
substantial, most of the Court's attention is focused on the competing state
interests: How strong are they? Can they be achieved with less of an im-
pact on the constitutional interest?26 5 In a curious way, constitutional law
goes on next to the Constitution.
These unfortunate consequences of balancing can be seen in Tennessee
v. Garner.2 6 Under Tennessee law, a police officer was authorized to use
deadly force to prevent the escape of a person who he had probable cause
to believe had committed a felony. Edward Garner, a fifteen year old
eighth-grader, was fatally shot in the back of the head while fleeing with
ten dollars and a stolen purse. Garner's father brought suit, claiming vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
seizures. The Court, through Justice White, applied a balancing ap-
proach. The Court's balancing rhetoric is worth quoting at length:
The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is un-
matched. The suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not
be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the inter-
est of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt
and punishment. Against these interests are ranged governmental in-
terests in effective law enforcement. It is argued that overall violence
will be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects
who know that they may be shot if they flee. Effectiveness in making
arrests requires the resort to deadly force, or at least the meaningful
threat thereof. "Being able to arrest such individuals is a condition
precedent to the state's entire system of law enforcement."
Without in any way disparaging the importance of these goals, we
are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently pro-
264, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985).
265. For example, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the balancing metaphor, used
in the name of the Constitution, seemed to divert our attention from the Constitution. The Court
based its decision, carving out a "public safety" exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), on the conclusion that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to
public safety outweighs the need for a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination." 467 U.S. at 657. As Justice Marshall noted in dissent, however, Miranda
was "not a decision about public safety; it was a decision about coerced confessions." Id. at 684. The
majority opinion says very little about the problem of coerced confessions which, after all, is the link
between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment. See also supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text
(discussing Quarles).
266. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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ductive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of nonvio-
lent suspects. The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of ap-
prehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism
in motion. . . . Petitioners and appellant have not persuaded us that
shooting nondangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to outweigh the
suspect's interest in his own life.
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony sus-
pects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It
is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where
the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not
justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate
when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police
arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify
killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed,
nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute
is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force
against such fleeing suspects.
It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of seri-
ous physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitu-
tionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.117
Garner demonstrates the limited role that constitutional analysis can
play in the elaboration of constitutional law. The constitutional value of
life is but one factor in a general policy discussion of proper police con-
duct. (It is hardly surprising that the opinion relies heavily on the ALI
Model Penal Code).2"' While the Fourth Amendment is certainly in-
volved in the case (by providing Garner's father a way into court), and
the opinion undoubtedly states what the Fourth Amendment prohibits and
permits, the decision does not seem to be about the Fourth Amendment.
The analysis neither relies upon nor constructs a theory of the Fourth
Amendment; it does not examine the purpose, scope or source of the pro-
tection against unreasonable seizures.2 69 The state lost the case because it
267. Id. at 9-11 (footnotes and citations omitted).
268. See, e.g., id. at 13-14, 16-17.
269. The result in Garner could have been reached through a non-balancing analysis of the con-
stitutional provision. The use of deadly force against another person clearly constitutes a "seizure" of
that person. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is needed for a seizure when the purpose
of the seizure is to hold the suspect for criminal investigation. The power to seize need not include
actions beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the seizure. Indeed, this is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment's general limit on seizures. Shooting a fleeing felon dead destroys the
purpose of the stop. Under this analysis, a broad statutory authorization to shoot fleeing felons cannot
be constitutional.
But this does not end the analysis. Fleeing felons are also a concern because they may be dangerous
to others. Police intervention in this circumstance may prevent harm. Police officers may take mea-
sures to prevent the occurrence of imminent harm. (We give the state this power in many ways, from
passing speeding laws to permitting firefighters to knock down homes to prevent the spread of fire).
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could not show that shooting suspects is a "sufficiently productive means"
of furthering its law enforcement interests."' (What grisly instrumental-
ism this is).
Does this transformation of constitutional law matter? Some might ar-
gue that balancing has made constitutional law more reasonable and ac-
cessible. But I believe that the transformation has important and troubling
consequences. Constitutional law provides a set of peremptory norms-a
checking power-that is basic to the American notion of a government of
limited powers. Equally important, although less frequently noted, is con-
stitutional law's validating function. As Charles Black noted long ago,
"one indispensable ingredient in the original and continuing legitimation
of a government must be its possession and use of some means for bring-
ing about a consensus on the legitimacy of important governmental mea-
sures."271 Constitutional cases provide a forum for the affirmation of
background principles and for ratification of changes in those princi-
ples-changes the amendment process could only sporadically produce.
Balancing undermines the checking and validating functions of constitu-
tional law. This is most apparent in opinions that adopt a legislative
voice, openly weighing costs and benefits in order to maximize social wel-
fare. If constitutional decisions and normal political decisions examine
similar variables in similar ways, then constitutional answers ought not to
"trump" non-constitutional answers; the constitutional process simply
serves as an arithmetic "check" on the non-constitutional process. Nor can
constitutional law perform its validation function if constitutional judg-
ment is reached in the same manner as the legislative judgment. The
Court's agreement might only show that the Court and the legislature
used the same calculator. These concerns are not alleviated even under the
best account of balancing offered above (that a court does not replicate the
legislative task but simply accommodates constitutional values with other
social interests). That account supplies no basis for the authority or ability
of a court to assign a value to the legislative output.
Claims that an interpretive strategy threatens the legitimacy of constitu-
tional review are easy to make but hard to prove. More easily seen is the
devastating impact that balancing has had on constitutional theory. Bal-
When a police officer has good reason to believe that a person poses an imminent danger to another,
the officer has a duty to prevent the harm and to protect the innocent. The seizure is reasonable, not
because the benefits outweigh the harm, but because we expect the state to intervene to protect and
preserve life. (Nor can the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause sensibly apply.) Therefore, where the
police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect threatens to cause serious harm, he may
prevent escape by using deadly force.
270. Furthermore, the Court offers virtually no explanation for its holding that deadly force may
be used against dangerous fleeing felons. What interests were on the scale and what weight they were
given remain a mystery.
271. C. BLACK, THE PEOPI.E AND THF CouRT 38 (1960).
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ancing opinions give one the eerie sense that constitutional law as a dis-
tinct form of discourse is slipping away. The balancing drum beats the
rhythm of reasonableness, and we march to it because the cadence seems
so familiar, so sensible. But our eyes are no longer focused on the Consti-
tution. If each constitutional provision, every constitutional value, is un-
derstood simply as an invitation for a discussion of good social policy, it
means little to talk of constitutional "theory."
Ultimately, the notion of constitutional supremacy hangs in the balance.
For under a regime of balancing, a constitutional judgment no longer
looks like a trump. It seems merely to be a card of a higher value in the
same suit.
C. Objectivity and the Loss of Voice
From the outset, balancing has attempted to supply a "scientific"
method for infusing a dry (or blind) doctrinalism with knowledge of the
world. In recent years-perhaps due to nagging criticisms about the prob-
lem of assigning weights-the Court has resorted with increasing fre-
quency to the jargon of economics and policy science in an attempt to look
non-wilful, scientific, and objective. As Professor Tribe has noted, "[p]art
of the allure of efficiency curves and cost-benefit calculations is the illusion
that . . . hard constitutional choices can be avoided . . . through the in-
exorable analytic magic of such equations."2 2 The result is that the heady
realism that informed early balancing opinions is largely gone. Three-
pronged tests, two-tier standards, and cost-benefit analyses litter the con-
stitutional landscape, the petrified remnants of a once vital approach to
law.2"' The reliance on "science" has troubling implications. Not only, as
272. Tribe, supra note 4, at 620.
273. See Nagel, supra note 8. This distinction between the early, pragmatic balancing cases and
the more recent "scientific" cases may reflect two different views of "objectivity." See Stick, Can
Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 369-85 (1986) (contrasting "fundamental objectiv-
ity"-claim that legal answers correspond to extralegal, scientifically derived norm-with "group ob-
jectivity"-claim that legal answer is consistent with internal, shared standards of rationality that are
generally followed).
This metamorphosis of balancing has not gone unnoticed on the Court. Concurring and dissenting
Justices have frequently decried the pseudo-scientific nature of modern balancing. See, e.g., New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985):
All of these "balancing tests" [in the Fourth Amendment area] amount to brief nods by the
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely a
convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can
conceal its differences.
Id. at 369-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 549 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court's ...
perception of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable [possessory interests of prisoners] is
not based on any empirical data; rather it merely reflects the perceptions of the four Justices who have
joined the opinion that the Chief Justice has authored."); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 681
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("results of the majority's [balancing] 'test' are announced with
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Professor Tribe points out, does a cost-benefit approach conceal important
questions of principle, it also threatens the constitutive potential of consti-
tutional law. American society addresses basic questions of social and po-
litical justice-such as the meaning of liberty, fairness, and equal-
ity-through the discussion of constitutional issues. Constitutional law
directs our attention to the underlying premises of our governmental
structure and forces us to consider whether we are, and wish to be, a
society that permits or tolerates particular exercises of governmental
power. In thinking about these questions, we discover and create-we
constitute-our social world.274
Some may argue that a balancing approach furthers this constitutive
process. If balancing is a natural and accepted form of reasoning for
resolving difficult personal, social, or political questions, then perhaps bal-
ancing makes constitutional law more accessible: We can all engage in a
discussion of whether we desire more law enforcement and less privacy, or
more speech and less quiet. But while balancing may have this potential,
it seems more often to have the opposite effect of distancing us from the
discourse. Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of sub-
jectivity, make us spectators as the Court places the various interests on
the scales. The weighing mechanism remains a mystery, and the result is
simply read off the machine. Scientific balancing decisions are neither
opinions nor arguments that can engage us; they are demonstrations.2 75
The balancers may respond that we are more than mere spectators be-
cause the process takes into account all of our interests. But such "virtual
representation" (assuming that it exists) wholly misses the point. It attrib-
utes to "voice" a marketplace meaning: One speaks only to express exoge-
nous, pre-existing preferences. This view fails to appreciate that the virtue
of voice is the opportunity to explore and to create through interac-
tion-not simply to register a private vote in a polling booth with the
curtain pulled.276
pseudo-scientific precision").
274. See J.B. WHIT-, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING 231-74 (1984); Singer, The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 64-66 (1984); Tribe, supra note 4, at
595.
275. Professor Nagel has attributed similar shortcomings to the Court's order "formulas" used in
deciding constitutional questions. Nagel, supra note 8, at 190-97. Professor Michelman has recently
argued that Justice O'Connor's use of a balancing approach in Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct.
1310, 1324-26 (1986) (dissenting), represents a commitment to "the Court's and the country's project
of resolving normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice of open and intelligible
reason-giving, as opposed to self-justifying impulse and ipse dixit. . . . The balancing test, with its
contextual focus, solicits future conversation . . . ." Michelman, supra note 108, at 34. Michelman's
praise of Justice O'Connor is more an attack on "objectivity" than a general defense of balancing.
Indeed, the "scientific" balancing cases evidence a clear rejection of the kind of practical reasoning and
judicial "self-government" that Michelman supports.
276. To be sure, the usual participants in a constitutive constitutional conversation are hardly
representative of society at large. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765,
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One sometimes senses a Justice's discomfort at his or her "scientific"
balancing effort. Occasionally, the Justice adds a final paragraph or two
that suggest a different way of thinking about the constitutional issue in
the case, paragraphs that typically get much closer to phrasing the ques-
tion in terms that society recognizes as constitutional. Consider Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Lassiter.277 Blackmun spends pages purporting to
show that the majority has weighed the interests improperly. Yet the
strength of the dissent appears in his concluding statement, which says
nothing about balancing:
[T]he issue before the Court . . . is whether [the petitioner] was
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard when the State moved to
terminate absolutely her parental rights. In light of the unpursued
avenues of defense, and of the experience petitioner underwent at the
hearing, I find virtually incredible the Court's conclusion today that
her termination proceeding was fundamentally fair. To reach that
conclusion, the Court simply ignores the defendant's obvious inabil-
ity to speak effectively for herself, a factor the Court has found to be
highly significant in past cases. I am unable to ignore that factor;
instead, I believe that the record, and the norms of fairness acknowl-
edged by the majority, compel a holding according counsel to peti-
tioner and persons similarly situated.
27 8
Are not the concerns that Blackmun identifies much closer to our concep-
tion of the constitutional protection of due process than a balancing of the
individual and governmental interests?
Look also at Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Mathews v. El-
dridge,79 the foundational case for modern due process balancing. After
diligently describing the calculus and weighing the various interests, Pow-
ell finds that the balance tipped against the claimant who had requested a
hearing prior to the termination of his Social Security disability payments.
Yet he concludes his opinion with a paragraph that begins:
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc weighing of
fiscal and administrative burdens against the interests of a particular
category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination
770-71 (1982). And given current power relations in society, the discussion in such a "vital national
seminar" may be graced with a brahmin lilt. But the solution is not to cut off debate by adopting a
scientific technique for deriving answers, it is to expand participation.
277. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 35-59 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
278. Id. at 57-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
279. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures
must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.280
Powell then examines whether the procedures offer the beneficiary a
meaningful opportunity to present his case. It is this paragraph-rather
than the finely tuned balancing that precedes it-that goes to the heart of
the case.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AN UNBALANCED WORLD
A. The Non-Ineluctability of Balancing
It would be idle to criticize balancing if constitutional adjudication nec-
essarily entails a weighing of interests. As I have tried to demonstrate
above, constitutional history belies the claim that balancing is inescapable.
Yet balancing has burrowed so deeply into everyday views of the Consti-
tution that it often is regarded as the inevitable method for deciding a
constitutional case. Let me examine two typical forms of this claim."8"
1. Non-Absolutes Require Balancing
The Court and commentators routinely remind us that constitutional
rights and provisions are not absolutes.282 Such statements are often fol-
lowed by an appeal to competing interests, as if a non-absolutist position
entails a balance.2 83
Exceptions to constitutional provisions, however, may be based upon
considerations other than the weight of competing interests. 8 4 For one
hundred years, the Court limited application of the seemingly absolute
contract clause2 85 by a number of principles that were not, at least on
their face, grounded in a balancing of the interests.288 History and inter-
280. Id. at 348.
281. A third argument-that the lack of self-defining phrases in the Constitution necessitates bal-
ancing-is convincingly answered by Laurent Frantz. Frantz, Reply, supra note 3, at 732-38; Frantz,
Balance, supra note 3, at 1433-34.
282. See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (" '[like many other constitu-
tional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute' ") (quoting Toomer v. Wit-
sell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
283. See id. (privileges and immunities clause does not preclude discrimination against nonresi-
dents where "there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment"); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391-93 (1950); M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.02; L. TRIBE,
supra note 44, § 12-2, at 583 ("Any exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment safeguards
represents an implicit conclusion that the governmental interests in regulating those activities are such
as to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas."); Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YAI.E L.J. 425, 442 (1982) ("It is unavoidable that courts,
faced with application of nonabsolutist constitutional provisions, frequently must balance interests.").
284. Frantz, Reply, supra note 3, at 750-53.
285. U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 10.
286. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (legislators cannot "bargain away" police
power of state).
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pretations of original intent have similarly limited application of the First
Amendment, despite the constitutional phrase "no law." '287
The balancers succeeded with the "no absolutes" argument because
they first used it against literalists. But there is plenty of room between
literalism and balancing. As Professor Schauer has observed, "absolute in
force is not the same as unlimited in range. A principle or right can be
absolute when applied without being applicable to every situation."288 Al-
though the balancers may have levelled telling blows at literalism, they
did not, by that fact alone, establish either the necessity or desirability of a
balancing alternative.
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States Steel Corp. v. Multi-
state Tax Commission289 nicely illustrates the way that constitutional pro-
visions may be read "non-absolutely" without adopting a balancing ap-
proach. The case considered the reach of the rarely invoked compact
clause, which provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State."2 9 ' A
number of states had entered into a Multistate Tax Compact to facilitate
determination of state and local tax liability of multistate taxpayers and to
promote uniformity and compatibility in state tax systems. U.S. Steel, ob-
jecting to a proposed audit by the Multistate Tax Commission, brought
suit to have the Compact declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
had never been ratified by Congress.
The Court conceded that "[r]ead literally, the Compact Clause would
require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into
any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration,
or interest to the United States."' 29 ' But it rejected such an absolutist read-
ing. Relying on precedent, history, the purpose of the provision, and the
structure of the Constitution, the Court "reaffirmed" the rule that "appli-
cation of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are 'directed to
the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States.' "292 Because we live in balancing times,
287. "We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person
then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction
of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech." Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). Of course, libel laws were exempted from First Amendment scrutiny until
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
288. Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpreta-
tion of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 903 (1979); see Frantz, Balance, supra note 3,
at 1435-38 (discussing selective absolutism in First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence).
289. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
290. U.S. CONSTr. art. I, § 10.
291. 434 U.S. at 459.
292. Id. at 471 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976)).
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Justice Powell followed this statement with the comment that "[tihis rule
states the proper balance between federal and state power with respect to
compacts and agreements among States." '293 But the opinion is decidedly
not a balancing opinion. It does not set out the problem as one of compet-
ing interests, nor does it purport to quantify or compare the strength of
state or federal interests. Applying the rule to the facts of the case, the
Court concluded that because the Compact did not authorize the member
states to exercise any powers that they could not exercise in its absence,
the agreement did not impermissibly threaten federal supremacy.
The compact clause looks every bit as absolute as the First Amendment,
yet the Court in United States Steel interpreted the provision to authorize
gaping exceptions without adopting a balancing analysis. Of course, this
analysis does not establish that the Court's interpretive technique is pref-
erable to a balancing approach. It should unsettle, however, the claim that
balancing inevitably follows from a non-absolutist reading of the
Constitution.
2. It's All Bhlancing
A second claim for the inevitability of balancing contends that all
thoughtful decisionmaking involves a balance. Faced with a choice, what
else can a rational person do but measure the importance of the options
against some common standard of evaluation such as "social good" or
"justice"?29' We may sometimes act on principles, the argument runs, but
these are simply the products of earlier balances.2 9 5
In life and law, however, we often make decisions in ways that cannot
be characterized as balancing. Many decisions based on notions of right
and wrong, fairness, desert, love, and passion seem to have nothing to do
with balancing. It is doubtful that one helps a friend because, on balance,
such conduct is more rewarding than any other activity she could under-
take at the moment. Nor is one likely to oppose racial discrimination be-
cause it is inefficient, or because the social costs of prejudice are far
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1951) ("No matter
how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' or how closely we hyphenate the words,
they are not a substitute for the weighing of values."); Shiffrin, General Theory, supra note 4, at
1249 ("[B]alancing is nothing more than a metaphor for the accomodation of values. Everyone
balances . . . ."); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MicH. L. REv. 619, 626 (1960) (reviewing A.
MEIKLFJOHN, PoITrrIcAt. FREEDOM (1960)) ("[T]he interpretation of the First Amendment in the
context of a concrete case requires judgment in the identification and appraisal of the competing
interests at stake.").
295. Indeed, one advocate of balancing states that "balancing would seem to be implicit in an
adversary system which inevitably contemplates at least two sides to every case." Mendelson, The
First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 481
(1964).
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greater than the individual benefits of being able to choose one's customers
or tenants. Behind many of the most important decisions we make, the
most important beliefs we hold, are judgments of principle that do not
reduce to balancing. These judgments may be leaps of faith; they may be
premises, not proofs. But they form the bedrock of our moral systems.
The same is true for some of our most important constitutional deci-
sions. It is difficult to read Brown v. Board of Education29 as based on a
conscious, or unconscious, balancing of the interests. Of course, as Profes-
sor Wechsler has noted, there were competing interests at stake.297 But the
Court based its decision-as has society-not on the balance of those in-
terests, but on the intolerability of racial discrimination.298 Gideon v.
Wainwright,99 the case guaranteeing indigent defendants appointed coun-
sel in felony prosecutions, did not purport to balance the interests. It is
fundamentally unfair, said the Court, to make a person risk loss of liberty
without someone trained in the law to help him present his case. Similar
arguments may be made about the reapportionment cases,300 Griswold v.
Connecticut,30 1 Shelley v. Kraemer,302 Loving v. Virginia,30 Mapp v.
Ohio304 Zobel v. Williams,305 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,0  and Reed v. Reed.307 In each of these cases, impor-
tant interests were in conflict. Each conflict was resolved, however, by a
principle that neither derives from, nor calls for, a balance of competing
interests.308 Consider also the sources of the following fundamental consti-
296. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
297. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 31-34
(1959).
298. It is this fact that makes Wechsler's statement of the problem so difficult to understand. See
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
299. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
300. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
301. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
302. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
303. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
304. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
305. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
306. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
307. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
308. Justice Harlan's opinions are typically cited as models of constitutional analysis and he is
also often placed in the balancing camp. But see Farber & Nowak, Justice Harlan and the First
Amendment, 2 CONsr. COMMENTARY 425 (1985) (arguing that Harlan has been misrepresented as
"ad hoc" balancer). Yet one of Justice Harlan's most famous opinions, his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), although it purports to be a balancing opinion, is in fact nothing of the
kind.
Poe involved a challenge by a married couple to a Connecticut statute that prohibited the sale of
contraceptives. A majority of the Court voted to dismiss the case on justiciability grounds. Justice
Harlan thought the Court should have reached the merits of the claim. In presenting his views on the
constitutional issue, he persuasively argued for the recognition of the right of marital privacy by
examining history, precedent, related constitutional provisions, and the consequences of accepting the
state's position. Harlan stressed the sanctity of the home, the intimacy of the marital relationship, the
intrusiveness of ihe statute, and the state's historical protection of the institution of marriage.
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tutional norms: states may not adopt protectionist regulations of com-
merce; a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment requires demonstration
of an intent to discriminate; important protections in the Bill of Rights are
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment against the States. Did
these principles enter our constitutional law through a balancing process?
Where, indeed, is the "balance" that establishes the power of judicial
review?
Some might argue that even if some constitutional principles are de-
rived without balancing, many difficult constitutional cases involve con-
flicts between such principles, and these conflicts can be resolved only by
balancing. This conclusion, however, is clearly false. For example, one
might characterize Bakke3 °9 as a case involving a fundamentai conflict be-
tween Bakke's interest in not being discriminated against on the basis of
his race and a minority student's interest in overcoming the effects of past
discrimination. But this conflict can and ought to be resolved by construct-
ing a theory of the Fourteenth Amendment-e.g., that the Amendment
embraces a "colorblind" standard (hence Bakke wins) or that it was in-
tended to help blacks achieve equality with whites (therefore Bakke's "in-
terest" does not flow from a proper interpretation of the Constitution).310
To be sure, choosing between these conceptions would involve us in a
fight about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but this is pre-
cisely what a difficult constitutional case ought to do. 11
The balancer's final resort is the argument that principles must at some
point give way to competing interests. The First Amendment, it might be
claimed, cannot protect a newspaper's publication of the location of our
ships at sea during wartime 12 or the right falsely to shout fire in a
Although he recognized that there is no "mechanical yardstick" for the constitutional determination,
id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)),
Justice Harlan made no attempt to weigh the state's interest in defining and promoting morality.
Instead he accounted for societal values in his description of the right. He viewed the marital right not
simply as a right inhering in individuals and thus to be weighed against a governmental interest in
regulation, but rather as a social value. The collapsing of the public/private distinction in the process
of defining the right made subsequent weighing of the government's interest unnecessary. Although
Justice Harlan made clear that the right he identified would not pertain to laws sanctioning adultery,
homosexuality, fornication or incest, these exceptions-demonstrating that there exists no absolute
right to sexual privacy-did not flow from the state's greater interest in preventing such activities.
They were based on an historical analysis: While the state has "always and in every age. . . fostered
and protected" the institution of marriage, "the law has always forbidden" these other sexual activi-
ties. Id. at 553.
309. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
310. Cf. Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, in PRAGTICAL REASONING 128-33 (J.
Raz ed. 1978) (many decisions based on "exclusionary reasons" which rule out lower-order "balance
of reasons").
311. Cf. Thomson, supra note 253 (discussing solutions to difficult moral questions in non-
balancing terms).
312. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
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crowded theatre."' 3 There are two responses here. First, the "exception"
may best be understood not as resulting from a balance but as resting
upon a principle internal to the constitutional provision. Thus, one could
reasonably view the "ships-at-sea" exception as based not on a conclusion
that military success is more important than the First Amendment, but
rather upon an appreciation that the First Amendment, which presup-
poses a functioning political system, can mean nothing in a society that
does not exist.31 4
This solution may appear too facile, and I am willing to concede for the
sake of argument that not all exceptions can be explained as "internal" to
the theory of the constitutional provision under review. The best example
may be Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.'1 5 There, the
Court apparently concluded that the importance of allowing the states to
combat the ravaging effects of the Great Depression simply overrode the
constitutional guarantees of the contract clause. Clever non-balancing ar-
guments can be made to justify Blaisdell,"'6 but I am willing to assume
that it is a balancing opinion and, moreover, that it reflects a proper use
of balancing. But to recognize a role for balancing in the extreme and rare
case is not to demonstrate its validity as a mode of interpretation for the
vast majority of constitutional cases. Blaisdell does not establish some
kind of continuum of balancing; it demonstrates merely that the extreme
case may invoke different principles than those under which we usually
operate.317
313. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
314. We might well speak here of the right "running out." That is, where the justification for, or
basis of, the right no longer applies, the right should not be recognized. This "internal" argument is
quite distinct from both the "external" evaluation of costs that balancing entails and other "external"
limits imposed on constitutional provisions. For an elaboration of this analysis, see C. FRIED, RIGHr
AND WRONG 9-10 (1978) (discussing boundaries of norms).
315. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
316. The Court hinted at a justification for its ruling similar to the one I ascribe to the "ships-at-
sea" exception: "The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance
of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,-a government which re-
tains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society." Id. at 435.
317. This claim seems consistent with everyday practice. Take the following example. I promise
to pick you up at the train station at noon. At 11:55 a.m., a friend breaks a leg and needs to be taken
to the hospital. If I take her, I won't get to the station until 12:30 p.m. Of course, I go to tio l1ispital
(even though I have no way of getting a message to you). One could say that implicit in my promise to
pick you up is the possibility that some pressing need will command my attention at exactly the time
the train arrives. But I won't even go that far. I will assume that I agreed to get you come hell or high
water and that I have decided to break the promise because of the unforeseen circumstance-because a
broken leg "outweighs" a half-hour wait at the train station. This emergency situation does not sug-
gest that I would have considered leaving you to watch the trains go by for any reason. I would not
have calculated costs and benefits if someone else asked me to lunch, if there were a television show on
at noon that I wanted to watch, or if I needed just thirty more minutes to develop a coherent theory of
equal protection law. See generally C. FRIED, supra note 314, at 10 ("IT]he concept of the cata-
strophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme situations in which the usual catego-
ries of judgment . . . no longer apply.").
A most troubling demonstration of this point is the Laffer Curve, the basis for supply-side econom-
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In sum, balancing is not inevitable. To balance the interests is not sim-
ply to be candid about how our minds-and legal analysis-must work. It
is to adopt a particular theory of interpretation that requires justification.
B. Is Not Balancing Unreasonable?
Balancing may appear inevitable, not because we can't think in non-
balancing ways, but because it seems unreasonable not to take all the rele-
vant interests into account in deciding an important question. A non-
balancing approach, however, does not require a court to be blind to the
consequences of constitutional rules or the social context in which consti-
tutional questions arise. 8 ' It would be curious, to say the least, for a court
to announce a rule to protect a constitutional value when empirical evi-
dence demonstrates either that the value is not threatened or that the rule
does not effectively protect the value. But this kind of attention to conse-
quences is quite distinct from a methodology that evaluates the importance
of the consequences in comparison to the underlying constitutional
provision.3 19
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,320 for example, the Court explored
the likely impact that libel rules would have on political expression.
While some have characterized Sullivan as a balancing case,321 it clearly
is not. The Court did not-as it has done in subsequent libel
cases-balance First Amendment interests against interests in preserving
reputation. It settled on a "malice" test (knowledge of falsehood or reck-
less disregard for falsity) because it deemed such protection of the press
necessary to effectuate fully the purposes of the Amendment. Speech based
on "knowing falsehood" and its close cousin "reckless disregard" are not
protected by the decision because they are not types of speech that further
First Amendment goals.322
ics. Few people would doubt that a tax rate of 100% would dampen entrepreneurial spirit and a rate
of 0% would stimulate it. But this tells us nothing about incentives for the rest of the possible brackets.
Recent events seem to show that acting on a curve drawn between the end-points can produce unan-
ticipated results, namely $200 billion deficits.
318. Many non-balancing rules of constitutional law demand examination of the real world-e.g.,
the "intent" standard of equal protection law, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and the
anti-protectionist principle of commerce clause analysis, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
319. Thus, there is much merit in Justice White's attack on the formalistic reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3205 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). But White's
"[r]ealistic consideration of the nature of the Comptroller General's relation to Congress," which
revealed that "the threat to separation of powers conjured up by the majority is wholly chimerical,"
id. at 3213, was not part of a balancing approach.
320. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
321. E.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.03.
322. A similar point may be made about the Miranda rule. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). A court might well conclude, based on a realistic understanding of the nature of police inter-
rogations, that a broad prophylactic rule is needed to ensure that the underlying right is adequately
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Thus there is no basis for the notion that non-balancing approaches are
necessarily formalistic or unconcerned with the social context of legal
rules. But the balancer may have a further claim: if looking at some real
world consequences is reasonable, why is it not more reasonable to look at
all of them? Should not our judgment on the constitutionality of state libel
laws turn, at least in part, on the damage that publication inflicts on rep-
utation? Why would the non-balancer want to ignore state interests that
compete with the constitutional value?
The problem here is that constitutional adjudication is not simply an
exercise in reasonable decisionmaking. Although a wide range of interests
might properly be noticed by legislative policymakers (or moral philoso-
phers), they are not, by that fact alone, constitutional concerns. If we are
interpreting the First Amendment, we need a theory of the Amendment
that tells us what counts as a constitutional reason and what does not. To
allow any "interest" to count simply because a rational policymaker might
want to consider it in constructing a reasonable rule of conduct cannot be
enough to render the interest "constitutional" without severely altering
our usual understanding of constitutional interpretation. " '
C. Alternatives
At this point in the argument the balancer usually turns the tables. "If
balancing is neither inevitable nor advisable, how should we read the
Constitution? How would you decide Roe v. Wade or Mathews v. El-
dridge? Here's a hypothetical: A terrorist announces that he has planted a
bomb . . . ." My first response is that it is probably wrong to search for
a single theory for understanding and interpreting the Constitution. 24
Certainly, our interpretive practice runs just the other way. There are a
number of interpretive techniques that we bring to most constitutional
questions: text, structure, precedent, consequences, history, intent, our
"ethical tradition, 3 25 notions of fundamental values. The Constitution is
protected. But this attention to real world events and the likely consequences of a constitutional deci-
sion is markedly different from deciding Miranda by "balancing" Fifth Amendment rights against the
interest in law enforcement.
323. This sad lack of theory is evident in the fact that the Court has not explained why balancing
is permissible (or required) in some areas of constitutional law but not in others. For example, no one
asserts that a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to testify against himself could be "outweighed"
in the case of a particularly serious crime. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). What
distinguishes the Fifth from the First? The Court has never provided an answer.
324. Not surprisingly, scholars have disagreed about the single principle that underlies the Con-
stitution. Compare J. ELY, supra note 116, at 87 (Constitution "overwhelmingly concerned" with
procedural fairness in resolution of individual disputes and with ensuring broad participation in the
"processes and distributions of government") with Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1689, 1732 (1984) ("prohibition of naked preferences. . . most promising candi-
date for a unitary theory of the Constitution").
325. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 558 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
1002
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a complex document with many different kinds of provisions drafted at
different times by persons with different goals. A unitary theory of consti-
tutional interpretation may be elegant, but it is likely to be a distinctly
unrealistic approach to the document.
Second, for plausible alternatives to balancing, we need look no further
than the case law. Although balancing has spread throughout constitu-
tional law, many constitutional cases are decided each Term in non-
balancing ways.3 26 Indeed, balancing and non-balancing approaches exist
side-by-side in many areas of constitutional law.327
The balancer, upon reflection, is not likely to disagree. However, she
might now respond: "I never said balancing was the only way. My claim
is simply that it is a useful, sensible way to answer some constitutional
questions. Your burden is to show that at every point there are alterna-
tives to balancing that are better ways of reading the Constitution."
There may not always be a preferable alternative to balancing. One
must approach cases and constitutional provisions one at a time. One must
ask at each point whether there are other ways of describing and analyz-
ing this constitutional question that do not raise the problems occasioned
by balancing and that do not pose the additional troubling problems that
balancing avoids. The point of this essay is to wake constitutional law out
of its balancing sleepwalk and to compel courts to ask those questions.
We are so locked into balancing modes of thought that breaking free
can be difficult. "Unbalancing" constitutional doctrine may seem like a
throwback to archaic3 28 or naive ways of thinking-ways that fail to ap-
preciate the "complexity" of human affairs. But searching for new modes
of thought (or rediscovering old ones) can be a liberating activity, one that
can restore to constitutional law its rightful place as something more than
a discussion of good policy. No longer need we fear that we really are just
replicating the work of legislatures. We can give up feigned mathematical
precision and objective constitutional science for serious theoretical investi-
gations of the meaning of constitutional language and structure. We can
in part).
326. For examples this past Term, see Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986); Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
327. Consider pairs of cases decided the same day interpreting (1) the First Amendment, Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (no balance) and Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (balance), and (2) separation of powers doctrine, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986) (balance) and Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986) (no balance).
328. It should be obvious, however, that there is nothing inherently conservative about non-
balancing approaches. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. Powell, Parch-
ment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 IowA L. REv. 1427, 1433-35 (1986) (an
appeal to the constitutional text "has the capacity to incite radical and even revolutionary attacks on
the legal status quo").
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begin again a lively discussion about the fundamental principles that we
believe undergird our political system.
VII. CONCLUSION
Severe problems beset balancing approaches to constitutional law. The
Court, under any of the versions of a balancing metaphor, has not ade-
quately explored the "mathematics" of balancing. As a way to avoid
problems in calculation, it has generally-with little theoretical justifica-
tion-adopted scaled-down equations that do not take account of all the
possible interests. Furthermore, recognizing the difficulty of developing
credible and external standards of evaluation, the Court has moved to
even more stylized versions of balancing in an attempt to demonstrate
"objectivity."
Even if we were able to construct a set of magical scales that would
address these internal criticisms of balancing, it is far from clear that we
ought to allow the Constitution to be put in the balance. In earlier days,
the global critique of balancing was often political. To the critics of the
1950's and 1960's, balancing was a technique for watering down constitu-
tional guarantees. Today, balancing opinions can tip either way. Much of
modern due process and equal protection law can be explained as the
Court placing its finger on the scale on behalf of individuals and minori-
ties. But rather than restoring balance to constitutional law, the easy re-
sort to balancing threatens constitutional law. Balancing has turned us
away from the Constitution, supplying "reasonable" policymaking in lieu
of theoretical investigations of rights, principles and structures.
Constitutional law may not represent the search for truth or beauty,
moral salvation or divine inspiration. But it is crucial for this political
society to have a distinct way of thinking and talking about fundamental
background principles of government-one that both connects up with,
and pushes beyond past understandings. Constitutional law will have
trouble helping to define the arena of politics if it is seen simply as an act
of ordinary politics. This is not to suggest that constitutional law is not
intensely political, rather that there is real value in seeing it as a different
sort of politics.
The balancers have gained the high ground, at this point, by adverse
possession. Balancing has attained legitimacy through the reputation of its
early advocates and the passage of time. Moreover, if constitutional inter-
pretation is ultimately a reflection of larger, deeper trends in social con-
sciousness, we may now simply be deaf to the criticisms of balancing. It is
deeply engrained in us to see law as a forum for competing interests and
moral and legal choice as turning on an evaluation of the strength of those
interests.
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Here, then, is the ultimate irony of balancing. Balancing was a liberat-
ing methodology at the outset. It took blinders off judges' eyes and let
them openly take into account the connections between constitutional law
and the real world. Preaching a pragmatic, realistic approach to constitu-
tional law, it promised doctrine arrived at objectively and grounded in the
facts of the society to which it applied. But balancing, whatever its merits
as a way out of formalism, has itself become rigid and formulaic. It gives
answers, but it fails to persuade.
Seventy years ago, Benjamin Cardozo wrote that "[m]etaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it."'3 29 Constitutional law is suffering in the
age of balancing. It is time to begin the search for new liberating
metaphors.
329. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N..E 58, 61 (1926); see Berlin, Does Politi-
cal Theory Still Exist?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 19 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds.
1962), quoted in L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 23 (1986) ("The history of thought and
culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which
inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new, emanci-
pating, and at the same time, enslaving conceptions.").
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